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Public Administration Review



THE JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY
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Public Administration Review

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IN THIS NUMBER

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Task Force : Methodology

By CHARLES AIKIN

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I

THE Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government undertook its work with unprecedented popular support but with widespread feeling among political scientists and responsible administrators that little good would come from it.¹ Both optimists and pessimists who have read the published reports of the Commission have revised their first guesses. Those who have searched these reports for reforms that if adopted would result in tremendous annual savings have been disappointed, although they may be gratified by finding proposals that could result in a significant simplification of the structure of the executive branch of the government. On the other hand, the cynics among the professionals can hardly avoid being surprised to find material in Commission and task force reports which they can heartily approve.

It would not be easy to indicate the extent to which the Commission met its responsibilities. It is not difficult to show that the Commission "paid its way" on a simple cash cost-cash saving basis.² While the long-run savings re-

sulting from the work of this body may reach hundreds of millions of dollars,³ any posthumous award given the Commission will be based on the part it played in the enactment of the Reorganization Act of 1949,⁴ the strengthening of the staff arms of the President, the centering of responsibility for military affairs in the Secretary of Defense, the streamlining of the Department of State, and the identification of problems involved in natural resource conservation and development, rather than on a record of billions saved.

This article is not concerned with the details of the many recommendations the Commission made; it is concerned with the agency itself. What, in fact, were the processes by which the Commission produced reports that upset the prophecies of the more sophisticated observers of its work? In brief, how did it get on with its work?

As *ad hoc* agencies take time to work out satisfactory and agreeable procedures, it is not surprising that this Commission did not become a smoothly operating machine immediately after its members were sworn into office at the White House on September 29, 1947. For one thing, no member of the body had a close acquaintanceship with all of his colleagues

NOTE: This study was undertaken and completed without consultation with, or the assistance of, any members of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government. The author did not assist in the preparation of any task force report.

¹ See, *Hearings . . . Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, United States Senate, Eightieth Congress, First Session, on S. 164, A Bill for the Establishment of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government*, pp. 32-49.

² Coincident with the plan of the Commission to issue the report of the Federal Medical Services Task Force highlighting the imminent expenditure of \$25,000,000 in hospital construction by the Veterans' Administration in the Houston, Texas area (indicated by the task force to be an unnecessary expense) the Veterans' Administration announced the abandonment of this construction.

³ The author discussed the question of savings that might result from the Commission's work in "The Story of the Hoover Commission," *California Monthly*, pp. 26-7, 82, June, 1949.

⁴ Public Law 109, 81st Cong., 1st sess. See, Letter of January 13, 1949, addressed to the two Houses of Congress by the Commission recommending that the President be granted reorganization powers. See also, the Commission's *General Management of the Executive Branch*, (pp. vii-xii) in which the letter was reprinted. The President of the United States addressed a message to Congress on January 17, 1949, recommending the enactment of a reorganization measure. Further, see Ferrel Heady, "The Reorganization Act of 1949," 9 *Public Administration Review* 165-74 (Summer, 1949).

before the machinery of the Commission was set in motion; and it would take time for mutual confidence—even understanding—to develop. For another, the charge given the Commission in Public Law 162, 80th Congress,⁵ was capable of a variety of interpretations⁶ and the commissioners found it impossible to agree on one of them. What the political situation would be on January 13, 1949—the statutory reporting date—might dictate which interpretation should prevail, and here one commissioner's guess was as good as another's.

Although records of the meetings of the Commission are not particularly enlightening with regard to early progress, they indicate that at a meeting on October 20, 1947, a statement of policy prepared by the chairman was agreed to. These records point out that a few commissioners made proposals for planning and organizing the work of the Commission, but

⁵ Section 1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress to promote economy, efficiency, and improved service in the transaction of public business in the departments, bureaus, agencies, boards, commissions, offices, independent establishments, and instrumentalities of the executive branch of the Government by—

- (1) limiting expenditures to the lowest amount consistent with the efficient performance of essential services, activities, and functions;
- (2) eliminating duplication and overlapping of services, activities, and functions;
- (3) consolidating services, activities, and functions of a similar nature;
- (4) abolishing services, activities, and functions not necessary to the efficient conduct of government; and
- (5) defining and limiting executive functions, services, and activities.

.....
Section 10. (a) INVESTIGATION.—The Commission shall study and investigate the present organization and methods of operation of all departments, bureaus, agencies, boards, commissions, offices, independent establishments, and instrumentalities of the executive branch of the Government, to determine what changes therein are necessary in their opinion to accomplish the purposes set forth in Section 1 of this Act.

⁶ The principal conflict in interpretation involved the question: did the legislative mandate "authorize the Commission to range over the whole span of civil government and to propose the abolition or limitation of great national programs such as social security, veterans' welfare, conservation, European aid, etc., or was it confined to proposing changes in 'the present organization and methods of operation of all . . . agencies . . . of the Executive Branch of the Government' in order to achieve the efficiency and economy set forth in the act as the objectives of the study? Even after the Commission had given careful and prolonged attention to the question, it was in doubt." Aikin, *op cit.*, p. 26.

that little came of these proposals. While between the fall of 1947 and the spring of 1948 several task forces were set up and put in operation and the Commission met for brief sessions at monthly intervals (except in July and August), it was not until late in the summer of 1948 that the Commission as a body undertook any significant work.

Throughout this long organizational period the Commission permitted its chairman to take the initiative and most decisions of the chairman had general Commission approval. It is likely that from the beginning each commissioner was determined to play his full part during the final months when Commission recommendations were being formulated, but for a long time a majority of commissioners was agreeable to leaving the controls in Mr. Hoover's strong hands.

This procedure resulted in isolating the members of the Commission other than the chairman from contact with task forces and consequently precluded them from directing or even participating in basic research. The policy of isolation was bound to have, and did have, repercussions later. Numerous dissents and separate opinions sprinkled through Commission reports testify to the results of this policy as much as they give evidence of fundamental cleavages within the Commission.

Research activities were carried on in many parts of the nation, but they were centered in New York and Washington. The Commission's small central staff was located in Washington. Although each task force was authorized to follow its own plan of operations, some responsibility for the direction of this work was assigned to the central staff. The staff spoke for the chairman, but in the name of the Commission. By spring, when the tempo of research was mounting and numerous decisions had to be made, this staff assumed a role of importance. Management firms and research committees were instructed in detail precisely what "the Commission" wished them to do. Letters from the public had to be answered and press releases had to be issued. The central staff undertook the tasks in the name of the Commission. Thus, as the months passed, the fiction of Commission unity of purpose grew into a dogma.⁷

⁷ Members of the Commission were kept abreast of some developments within the scattered and semi-inde-

The central staff was never large. Until late in 1948 it was composed of five members, in addition to personnel and supply officers, stenographers, and messengers. The head of this staff, who on October 20, 1947, was appointed administrative assistant to the chairman, was assisted by two principal and two junior aides.⁸ In the fall of 1948, this staff was enlarged with men selected to handle publicity and press relations and others to prepare preliminary drafts of Commission reports.⁹

The basic decision of the Commission to rely on task forces for research rather than on a large central staff was not taken casually. The excellent results that had been obtained from earlier agencies that had been set up to investigate federal executive branch organization and operation, particularly from the staff of the President's Committee on Administrative Management, did not impress the majority of the Commission. Rather, it was decided to employ "a minimum staff which would coordinate and make available" to the task forces "the great mass of information now already accumulated by various parts of the Government."¹⁰

The work of the Commission was somewhat impeded by the lack of men in its central staff who were especially skilled, on the one hand, in the operation of government and, on the other, in the need for, and techniques of, research. The running guidance some of the task forces sought was not always forthcoming. The delimiting of fields assigned to each of the more than a score of independent research groups was a continuing problem. Overlapping

pendent branches of their agency through information acquired by their assistants, most of whom were resident in the Commission's Washington office.

⁸ One of the principal assistants bore the title of research assistant to the chairman. He conferred frequently with members of the staffs of some of the task forces, but he did not assume the responsibility of directing their work. Of these five staff members, one came to the Commission from the federal civil service, one was the representative of a tax group, and the remaining three had been bankers.

⁹ The principal assistants to the commissioners (with the exception of the assistant to the chairman) remained wholly independent of this staff.

¹⁰ Policy Statement, October 20, 1947. The document, *A Compilation of Basic Information on the Reorganization of the Executive Branch of the Government of the United States, 1912-1947*, was prepared for the Commission by the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress in September, 1947.

areas for investigation were bound to occur. Instead of supplying needed delimitation, each task force leader was instructed to proceed as though his study was the only one that was being made. It was not until fairly late in the life of the Commission that conscious efforts were made to coordinate the work of the task forces. Prior to this time efforts at rationalizing this work fell to the chairman rather than to the staff; and the chairman struggled bravely with it.

II

THE decision of the Commission, despite expressed misgivings of a minority of its members, that the major responsibility for research and preliminary investigation should fall to its twenty-three task forces¹¹ provides the student of administration with a laboratory for testing the usefulness of that device. Indeed, the value of this experiment is greatly enhanced by the fact that task forces were established according to no set pattern. While the organization and procedure of each project was determined in part by the action of the Commission in setting it up, the head of the task force—the individual, committee, or management firm responsible to the Commission—proceeded as it saw fit. It was inevitable that under such an arrangement a wide variety of procedures would evolve.

In its initial decision with regard to the use of task forces, the Commission declared that it was its intention to:

3. Enlist eminent and experienced citizens to explore and furnish the Commission with their steady judgment on what action should be taken in respect to each separate group or function. Such leaders would add public confidence to the conclusions of the Commission and would reduce the number of questions for final determination by the

¹¹ The Commission staff developed no wholly satisfactory system for numbering task forces. The regular list of twenty-three task forces does not include the Territories and Dependencies project by Rupert Emerson or the Memorandum on the Department of Labor by George W. Taylor, although each is as substantial a study as that made by Task Force 18, Public Relations Activities. Task Force 1 on the Presidency and Departmental Management might well be counted as two independent studies even though Messrs. Don K. Price and J. D. Millett shared the basic data each collected. The special study of the Department of Commerce was not even referred to in the Commission's report on that department.

Commission. Each leader would need be free to organize his own task force to survey the particular functions assigned to them. They should be furnished with all existing material by the Commission's staff. Should they require further research, they should be authorized to secure their own research assistants.¹²

The full meaning of this policy decision could be understood only after there had been considerable experience with operations under it. Whether or not the men selected to make the several studies would be men of the eminence the Commission had in mind would depend on the care taken in making selections and on the willingness of those selected to serve. The right men selected for this work would lend public confidence to the work of the Commission itself and would add strength to the force of its recommendations—that is, of course, if the Commission and these men agreed on what should be done. The possibility that this assumption might not prove sound did not come in for extended consideration at the outset.

If task force personnel were not selected solely for their ability to bring dispassionate and informed judgments to bear on the problems facing the Commission, then difficulties were certain to arise, because many of the issues confronting the Commission were peculiarly susceptible to partisan treatment. Passions might not be aroused over a critical study of the administrative structure of the Post Office, but studies of executive branch operations in the field of natural resource conservation or federal business enterprise offered ample scope for biased treatment. The job of the Commission was a difficult one at best. It was particularly important that it avoid appointing the "wrong people" to lead the task force research.

It has been indicated that the commissioners were not kept abreast of task force developments or encouraged to participate in task force work. An apparent, but not real, exception to this rule is found in the fact that several commissioners were assigned special responsibilities with one task force each. One commissioner assisted in the establishment of the task force assigned to study and report to the Commission regarding the Post Office. While he did not participate in the actual work

of the task force he was kept informed of its progress and he defended its recommendations before the Commission. Another worked actively with the personnel management group. This commissioner's intimate contacts with personnel administration not only made his judgment of particular value to the task force, but also led him to play a dominant role in the formulation of task force recommendations and in the drafting of the Commission's personnel report.¹³ Three other commissioners had some part in the work of the Natural Resources, the Federal-State Relations, and the Foreign Affairs Task Forces. The part of the chairman in directing the task force on the Presidency is not included in this list as Mr. Hoover maintained a direct and intimate contact with all study groups.¹⁴

Despite these limited contacts that individual commissioners maintained with task forces, the fact remains that the Commission as an operating agency was entirely cut off from task force developments—except for quite general progress reports made by half a dozen task forces at Commission meetings prior to the summer recess. Moreover, some of the most vigorous Commission debates occurred in connection with reports of the half dozen task forces just mentioned. A number of pointed dissents and separate opinions were attached to Commission reports covering these same areas. Not one of the congressional members assumed special responsibilities in connection with the work of any task force, yet these four commissioners certainly never abdicated their responsibilities as commissioners.

III

IT is impossible to classify the twenty-three task forces into two or three neat categories. Four studies were directly related to the work of Cabinet departments¹⁵ and one to an agency

¹² The late Commissioner (and Secretary of Defense) Forrestal did not participate actively in the extensive deliberations of the Task Force on National Security Organization and even absented himself from Commission meetings when the Commission took up the writing of its report on military organization and operation.

¹³ Commencing late in November, 1948, the chairman shared with the vice chairman his responsibility for supervision of research and formulation of recommendations for top executive management. The collection of data in this field was in the hands of Mr. Don K. Price.

¹⁴ Post Office, Agriculture, National Security Organiza-

¹⁵ Policy Statement, October 20, 1947.

of approximate Cabinet status.¹⁶ A number of studies were made of federal agencies and activities. All studies touched on staff services, although Federal Personnel, The Federal Supply System, Records Management, and Government Information Services Task Forces were primarily concerned with such services. The Fiscal, Budgeting, and Accounting Activities project divided its interest between staff and line organizations and operations. In addition to the project on the Presidency and Departmental Management three task forces fell into classes of their own: Federal-State Relations, Federal Field Services (in no direct way related to the study of Departmental Management), and Indian Affairs.

Of greater interest than the type of assignment undertaken by the several task forces are the varied plans the Commission adopted in setting up these research groups. The Commission, so far from adhering to a single arrangement in creating its task forces, scarcely can be said to have laid down even a general pattern for task force operations. A partial, and important, exception to this rule is found in the fact that the Commission did lean heavily on prominent citizens who were asked to undertake the organization and direction of task forces or to recommend courses of action for task force leaders to follow. Such committees were used in fifteen of the twenty-three task forces.

These committees varied in size from two¹⁷ to more than thirty.¹⁸ With few exceptions they undertook their work with seriousness of purpose and continued to serve in the same spirit. In most cases these volunteer committees were

tion, and State. The Fiscal, Budgeting, and Accounting Activities, the Natural Resources, and the Public Works Task Forces dealt at length with the Treasury and the Interior Departments.

¹⁶ The Veterans' Affairs Task Force.

¹⁷ Foreign Affairs. Three men were appointed to the Regulatory Commissions Task Force Committee, but one member was unable to serve after the period of organization had come to an end.

¹⁸ Seventeen members and seventeen consultants were appointed to the Public Works Task Force. The Task Force on National Security Organization included a general committee of fourteen, a military advisory committee of nine, and nine consultants. The Medical Services Task Force was composed of a committee of seventeen members with ten consultants in addition to its small research staff.

assisted by staff members who carried on necessary research under the supervision of their committees. The reverse of this situation was found in Federal Supply, Records Management, and Lending Agencies Task Forces. In these cases committees were selected to advise the project directors in the conduct of research and in the preparation of reports rather than to direct research themselves and then report to the Commission.

In half a dozen cases the task force chairmen served also as directors of research. This was emphatically the case with the National Security Organization, Medical Services, Indian Affairs, Regulatory Agencies, and Public Works Task Forces and was largely true in the Fiscal, Budgeting, and Accounting Activities group. In such cases the chairman-research director played a dominant part both in the collection of data and in the framing of recommendations for Commission consideration.

Five business management firms either made up task forces or assisted in their work.¹⁹ Two such firms reported directly to the Commission without the interposition of a supervisory committee. As the Post Office is in many ways comparable to a huge private business undertaking, it did not seem illogical to the Commission to assign the study of it to a management firm experienced in the survey of such firms. Nor was a committee set up to supervise the study of federal field offices. Had this study not involved some of the most important, difficult, and least understood problems in the determination and execution of federal administrative policy, such a plan of task force operation would have seemed reasonable.²⁰

An analysis of the structure and work of the Veterans' Administration was delegated to a committee composed of prominent insurance company executives. This committee confined its work to the insurance phases of the Veterans' Administration; but as it was appointed to report on the entire agency it contracted all of

¹⁹ If the two accounting firms of Haskins & Sells and Price, Waterhouse & Co are included in this list—they performed work of a type similar to that of the other five—the number would be increased to seven. The former reported on federal revolving fund agencies and the latter dealt with lending agencies.

²⁰ The report of the Federal Field Offices Task Force, (along with the reports of a number of other task forces see Note 27, below), was not published.

the Administration's operations other than insurance to a management firm. The only arrangement where a management firm was employed in a somewhat similar way was in the Federal Supply project. There the director of the project employed such a firm to analyze one of the many problems the task force had to deal with, that of traffic management. The citizens' committee directing the Personnel Management Task Force was an active and skilled one. It did not depend on its members for extensive research; instead, it delegated this phase of the work to a management firm and founded its own report on data the staff of the firm assembled.

Three private research organizations wrote four of the task force reports; and one federal agency and one quasi-governmental association were responsible for one each. The Brookings Institution, acting without the intervention or assistance of a citizens' committee, wrote both the Transportation and Welfare reports; and the National Bureau of Economic Research prepared the report on Statistical Agencies. The National Records Management Council wrote the Records Management report. In this work it was assisted by six consultants, five of whom were then in active government service. The Council of State Governments made an elaborate study of the recent history of state-national relationships for the consideration of the project committee on Federal-State Relations, and the Library of Congress provided the Natural Resources committee with data that were fundamental to its work.²¹

Mention of the fact that a number of task forces that employed management firms or private or public research organizations produced valuable reports is not intended to imply that the Commission found other modes of task force operation less satisfactory. In the cases of both Foreign Affairs and Agriculture Task Forces the supervising committee selected an executive secretary or research director who

built up a staff of investigators and directed the gathering of material needed by the committees. The executive secretary was permitted to plan his work without excessive supervision by his committee. The excellence of the task force report on Foreign Affairs gives evidence of the basic soundness of this mode of procedure as well as of the quality of the research staff and the ability of the executive director.²²

IV

THE barrier that was erected between task forces and the Commission gave the task forces almost complete freedom in the organization and execution of their several assignments. This separation provided a well equipped and smoothly operating group with an excellent opportunity to write a report of quality supporting thoughtful recommendations. But this very isolation developed into a major weakness. A task force composed of recognized specialists in a particular field, supplied with ample funds for conducting necessary investigations into that field, and generally managing its affairs as it saw fit, tended to become a limited edition of the Commission itself. This lack of supervision led some task forces to press for the immediate adoption of their proposals by executive branch agencies instead of devoting their efforts to developing material solely for the consideration of the Commission.²³ Also some task force leaders, anticipating that their reports to the Commission would be published, regarded their proposals as "reports to the nation" rather than to the Commission.

The common attitude of the specialist toward the review of his work by generalists was not wholly absent in the case of task forces attached to the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government. While there was no discernible tendency on the part of project directors to "look down their noses" at the (to them) lay commissioners, a certain amount of impatience on

²¹ Task force reports are sprinkled with complimentary references to help and cooperation received from agencies within the executive branch of the government and Commission personnel who called on representatives of these agencies for assistance agree that such cooperation was outstanding. While the greatest assistance came from the Bureau of the Budget, other agencies gave much time and effort to supplying requested information.

²² The invaluable volumes of supporting data written by the staff of the Foreign Affairs Task Force were not published by the Commission.

²³ For an example of such activity see *The Post Office*, Appendix I, p. 32, January, 1949.

their part developed in the spring and summer of 1948. In some cases, as indicated above, task forces assumed the responsibility of recommending to agencies surveyed that they change their organization or methods of operation immediately. In at least one instance, members of a task force became disturbed when the agency that was its principal concern refused to institute changes the task force considered beneficial. The possibility that the Commission at a later date might make recommendations that were not in agreement with those of the task force may not have occurred to project leaders.

This problem was complicated by the fact that the sharp line dividing the solely advisory task forces from the responsible Commission was not always clearly drawn in the minds of federal officials. Only the initiated were fully aware of how functions were divided between research staffs and the Commission itself. Press releases issued from Commission headquarters were not always helpful. Such releases were issued whenever a group of outstanding citizens was added to task force staffs, and there was a broad implication conveyed both to the public and to these men themselves that the Commission would rely heavily on the national leaders thus drafted into the service of the Commission. Consequently, it is hardly surprising that some administrators were swayed by arguments of task force leaders.

It was not uncommon for task force personnel to discuss their conclusions with the heads of agencies that they had examined, with no direct intention of trying to prevail upon these heads to adopt them.²⁴ However, when such administrators were impressed both with the strength of the recommendations and with the position of influence within the Commission occupied by the recommenders, they on occasion proceeded to put these recom-

²⁴ The barrier between Commission and task forces occasionally was broken down, accidentally, as a result of this practice. Some task forces circulated their tentative reports widely among persons (both in and out of government) who were competent to pass judgment on them. A number of such reports, or summaries of them, reached members of the Commission or their assistants in the course of this circulation.

mendations into effect to the extent of their powers without waiting for further Commission consideration. Because of this development the Commission instructed its central staff to impress all task force leaders with the fact that their responsibility was to the Commission alone, and that the Commission would give due weight to task force suggestions and arrive at its independent judgment.²⁵

The influence of the task force reports has been limited by the fact that the Commission published only a portion of these reports. Of the twenty-three reports²⁶ only five were printed in full; six were entirely omitted from publication. The Commission did not indicate what the precise reasons were that led to this partial publication.²⁷

²⁵ The isolation of commissioners from task forces was in part ended in the summer of 1948 (while the Commission itself was in recess) by joint action taken by the assistants to the commissioners. This group held a series of informal meetings with task force representatives in the hope of discovering, first, how the task forces were conducting their affairs, and, second, what was the nature and content of proposed task force recommendations. Representatives of task forces met with the group at formally scheduled meetings to outline their work and to respond to questions that at times were searching. While a few task force representatives participated in these meetings with some reluctance, others, themselves unhappy at being isolated from members of the Commission, welcomed the opportunity of appearing before the assistants in the hope, generally realized, of thereby reaching the commissioners.

The very able leader of one task force adopted a novel way of reaching beyond the Commission. Well before reporting to the Commission he met with the two committees of Congress concerned with the subject matter of his investigation and discussed his problems with them.

²⁶ Twenty-four, if the report of Overseas Administration (which also was not published) is counted as a separate report.

²⁷ It is to be regretted that a considerable number of volumes of supporting data developed by task forces were not published; this material would be of real value both to those with a specialist's interest and to public leaders. All task force reports, however, have been delivered to the two Houses of Congress, and congressional committees have made a further portion of this material generally available. See, *Concluding Report* (pp. 74-82) for lists of all task force reports, both those printed and those delivered to Congress in typescript. Doubtless voluminous files of information developed by task forces but not set out in typescript will be placed in the National Archives.

V

THE trickle of reports from task forces to the Commission that began in the late summer of 1948 quickly grew to a deluge, and the estimates that two million words were dumped on the desks of commissioners may not be an exaggeration.²⁸ Not only was this burden on the individual commissioners very great but, in addition, they were somewhat hampered in their study by the fact that these reports followed no single pattern or form. A commissioner could not pick up a report and know in advance how the material contained in it would be organized.

In a number of cases the entire report of a task force was reduced to a single compact volume. Some reports opened with summaries of recommendations; others required a search in order to discover precisely what the task force was proposing. A number included statements of savings that could be realized if the recommendations were adopted. Some incorporated more than one report in one volume. Others submitted a one-volume basic report and appended a number of supplements. The excellent report of the Task Force on National Security organization, for example, was contained in four compact volumes. The equally good report of the Foreign Affairs Task Force was composed of an initial report and five volumes of appendixes. The report of the Task Force on Federal-State Relations was made up of a brief committee report, an elaborate study of the division of powers between states and nation, a legal analysis of state and national power, and a study of overlapping state and federal taxes. The Federal Medical Services project favored the Commission with more than a dozen reports drafted by the task force committee and its subcommittees. The Regulatory Commissions study reached the Commission in the form of a committee report and nine volumes of supplementary reports written by nine specialists. The committee report included brief summaries of the nine special studies. Even these several modes adopted by task forces in their

²⁸ Late in November the reports of three task forces covering nearly 3,000 pages were distributed to the commissioners within the space of forty-eight hours.

reporting to the commission could not be considered as typical.²⁹

By the end of the summer, 1948, it became apparent that the commissioners were taking their responsibilities seriously, that the passive approach which had characterized their work earlier had come to an end. The Commission extended its meetings beyond a single morning session once a month until by December Commission meetings, plenary and committee, came to occupy a large proportion of the commissioners' time.³⁰ This change in attitude came none too soon, as the act of Congress under which the Commission was operating provided that a report should be submitted to Congress on January 13, 1949.³¹

Up to Thanksgiving Day the Commission was meeting without carefully prepared agenda,³² but during November pressure of work³³ compelled the Commission to adopt a radically revised plan of operations which was put into effect late that month. This plan called for the abandonment of the highly generalized discussions that had characterized meetings of the Commission up to that time and for the establishment and use of committees of the Commission. These committees

²⁹ A further barrier to the easy assimilation of the material and recommendations of the task forces lies in the fact that reports that touched similar subjects or a single agency did not always agree. In obvious cases where such conflicts were developing the chairman of the Commission met with project leaders involved in emerging conflicts prior to the filing of final reports in the hope of mediating differences and thus avoiding these conflicts. A careful reading of the reports indicates that this effort was not invariably successful.

³⁰ Staff preparation for Commission meetings tended to be casual. Until near the end of 1948 the Commission rarely commenced the study of a task force report with a preliminary analysis in its members' hands and with proposals for possible action distributed to commissioners prior to the meetings. Eventually an analyst was employed to prepare précis of task force reports, but there was little connection between the work of the analyst and the Commission's handling of the task force reports.

³¹ Congress extended this date by joint resolution on January 3.

³² A "Schedule of Meetings" of the Commission, of the assistants to the commissioners, and of the task forces was issued during most of 1948, but this report did not include agenda for Commission meetings.

³³ The Commission met for eight days in November as compared with two in October, one in September, and none in July and August.

were instructed to digest and analyze task force reports and to draft tentative reports for consideration at full Commission meetings. As a part of this arrangement the Commission rarely considered a task force report until it had before it the recommendations of its appropriate subcommittee.

On November 22, the chairman announced the selection of the first five committees. By December 7, the number of committees had increased to twelve. The chairman suggested that all reports open with a brief discussion of the existing situation in the agency or agencies under consideration, indicate what was wrong with their structure and organization, note changes that should be effected, and end with a statement of savings that could be anticipated if the proposed changes were put into effect. The several committees did not always find it convenient or even feasible to follow this outline and, as a consequence, each committee drafted the report it considered most appropriate to the problem at hand.

No agency could have been more conscientious than the Hoover Commission once it reached the report-drafting stage of its work. The committees worked hard in drafting and redrafting reports for consideration by the Commission, and never did the Commission merely rubber-stamp the report of one of its committees. Rather, it examined each report: page by page, sentence by sentence, word by word. Each commissioner expressed his views with freedom, frequently with vigor. Once a committee report had been reviewed and amended it was sent back to the committee for redrafting—sometimes as often as five or six times. In early meetings of the Commission there had been a tendency on the part of the members to abide by the "sense of the meetings." In the stage of its work in which reports were drafted the Commission settled all major—and minor—questions by formal vote.

VI

ADOZEN congressmen, federal executives, and private citizens in twenty months spent nearly \$2,000,000 in search of ways and means of identifying and eliminating inefficiencies and structural weaknesses in the executive branch of the federal government. They did not follow the plan of research used a decade

earlier by the President's Committee on Administrative Management,³⁴ but instead created and relied on task forces. Although this plan of depending on eminent citizens for the collection of basic data showed some weaknesses in operation, it did succeed in bringing a significantly wide range of informed judgment into play in the consideration of a legion of complex problems. The fact that scores of well-known and highly regarded men were at work on Commission affairs so directed public attention to this body that neither Congress nor the nation could wholly ignore it. Moreover, one outgrowth of the task force plan is that many men who inevitably will be called on in the future to advise federal agencies will give advice savored with knowledge and breadth of perspective acquired through work on a Hoover Commission task force.

It is of more than passing significance that the Commission created as a bipartisan body should prove itself to be genuinely nonpartisan. If ever a vote in the Commission divided according to party registration of the members, which is doubtful, it occurred by accident and not by political design. Nor does any report of the Commission reflect the view of any politically dominant group in the nation. Problems of executive branch operations showed themselves to be as little partisan as those of American foreign policy, of the development of national military strength, or of the protection of civil liberties.³⁵

³⁴ One pronounced difference between the Brownlow Committee and the Hoover Commission is that the earlier body had only a small fraction of the funds available that were appropriated for the Commission. In fact, several of the task forces of this recent body each spent more money than was spent by the Brownlow group for all of its work.

³⁵ An interesting example of the lack of partisanship of the Commission carried over into Congress occurred on August 16. On that date the Senate refused its concurrence in President Truman's first reorganization plan, issued under the Reorganization Act of 1949. While the plan was not identical with that recommended by the Commission, it was very similar and had the personal support of Mr. Hoover. In the unfavorable vote on the plan Senator McClellan joined twenty-two other Democrats in voting against the President's proposal. Senator Aiken, on the other hand, joined three other Republicans in voting in support of the proposal. Both senators were members of the Commission.

Other conclusions that were never spelled out in a single report of the Commission may be drawn from the work of this body. Prominent among them is the recognition given to the crucial position of the President in American government. Task force leaders were quick to discover that the authority of heads of government departments was seriously curtailed by both law and custom. With few exceptions they searched for ways and means of preventing the agency or service of their concern from being placed outside the span of effective leadership. They were aware that an administrative agency attached to or intimately associated with the President was so directly in the stream of policy formation that it would neither atrophy nor be compelled to associate itself with powerful congressional blocs for self-preservation—contrary to the constitutional mandate. This discovery led a considerable number of task forces to search for devices through which the agency or service in question could be located in the White House—or at least attached to the Executive Office—and thereby they could achieve the objective of by-passing the regular administrative hierarchy.³⁶ National acceptance of such a plan did not find full favor with the Commission. It would have weakened further the Cabinet system and strengthened an executive high command independent of the Cabinet and located in the Executive Office.

The Commission, even more than its task forces, became increasingly preoccupied with the improvement of administrative management.³⁷ In the end a majority of the members

* An important exception to this tendency was the recommendation of the Fiscal, Budgeting, and Accounting Activities Task Force that "the budgeting organization" should be taken from the Executive Office and be returned to the Treasury Department. The members of that task force were aware of the significance of inserting an officer subject to Senate confirmation—and, in particular, the Secretary of the Treasury—between the budget chief and the President. See also the proposal of the Federal-State Relations Task Force for the creation of "A Committee of Governors and Federal Officials" for a "constant consideration of state and federal relations and an analysis of changing situations."

³⁷ One criticism that has been directed toward the Commission's recommendations in this regard lies in the lack of specificity of many of them. In cases where the Commission reached a consensus only after ex-

became convinced that only on the basis of management improvements could the nation be assured better administration. So also with economy. If the Commission was not prepared to propose the abandonment of substantive legislation programs—and it rarely was—it would not be possible for it to demonstrate how a direct annual saving of billions of dollars of taxpayers' money could be achieved. Thus it sought to lay a foundation for operational economy through improved management techniques. Implicit in the basic first report of the Commission, *General Management of the Executive Branch*, is the belief that economy in the executive branch cannot be assured where responsible executives are crippled in their authority to plan and direct their work.

In their twenty months of work as members of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government the twelve commissioners found, to the genuine concern of a few of them, that much of the responsibility for what was not desirable within the executive branch could be laid at the doors of Congress. Congress, it developed, was playing a major, and scarcely backstage, role in the drama of executive branch inefficiency, extravagance, and waste. Awareness of this fact grew as the Commission worked its way through the maze of executive branch problems. Again and again it became clear that efficiency and the identification of authority and responsibility could not be achieved unless Congress—or rather, key committees and powerful individuals in Congress—were willing to forego certain powers and functions it had reserved to itself. While this awareness on the part of some commissioners came gradually, the stream of supporting data grew until it engulfed even those members who stood against it.

This problem presented a dilemma. Give power to the executive branch—allow it adequate staff and authority so that it could plan and program its work; appropriate funds to it in broadly phrased grants freed of item-by-

tended debate it not infrequently happened that the resulting recommendations lacked precision; sharp, clear, specific task force recommendations not infrequently were blurred in the process of translation into Commission findings.

item review of appropriation committees; vest supervisory and directory authority in agency heads in an equally broad fashion; free executive branch officers from minute accounting supervision; give top officials salary increases somewhat comparable to those granted to employees in lower brackets; and integrate all executive branch units into the line of authority extending down from the President to the lowest administrator even though such a grant of authority would collapse administrative empires—and what would happen to American democracy? Inevitably, along with improved efficiency and economy some power would be misused. This would not happen often, perhaps, but often enough for voices back home to make themselves heard on the Hill, for editors and columnists to point with scorn or alarm at incompetence or evil and magnify it out of its relative importance. Well informed and politically wise congressmen could hardly avoid facing the fact that there was risk in granting broad powers to the President and to huge bureaucratic agencies. Should they, in a search for economy, efficiency, and a centering of responsibility, take the risk, or should they continue to preserve restraints on the power to act wisely and forcefully in ninety-nine cases lest it be misused in one? Should they find satisfaction in tying the hands of administrators from President down to unit chief in order to prevent ill-use of position and power even though the nation's ability to act in crises, big and little, is thereby curtailed? Public acts by congressional members of the Commission in the period since the Commission filed its reports with Congress give testimony to the fact that it has been difficult for them to support and defend Commission recommendations.

It has not appeared easy for members of

the two Houses of Congress to realize that with a clarification of executive responsibility—with the removal of quibbling impediments to an administrator's power to act—goes a comparable strengthening of Congress itself, even though it is only on the basis of such action that public accountability can be assured. This point was developed in Commission discussions and lies behind many Commission recommendations. To be sure, the history of the past thirty years of congressional action has shown a partial awareness of this fact; not only has Congress sought to strengthen the executive branch through great administrative reform laws from the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 to the Reorganization Act of 1949, but through these acts Congress has consciously improved its own ability to cope with public problems. Without these changes it would not have been easy for Congress and the Executive to have cooperated as they have during the past decade—to fight a war, to develop a bipartisan foreign policy, and to do a thousand lesser things. These developments have made it possible for Congress to review and appraise the effectiveness of the policies it adopts and to determine where responsibility lies in cases of failure. The work of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government has highlighted the heightened need for further application of this doctrine. During the past few months the response of Congress to many of the recommendations of the Commission has been heartening. The basic precepts the Commission laid down in its first great report and amplified in detail later should continue to serve as a guide to Congress, and to the executive branch as well, until the day comes for a further survey and appraisal of the executive branch and its relations with Congress.

State Reorganization Surveys

By HUBERT R. GALLAGHER

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AS CONGRESS considers the Hoover Commission report on the reorganization of the executive branch of the federal government, legislatures in twenty-seven states have authorized reorganization studies or investigations directed at overhauling and streamlining state governments. In many instances, state reorganization commissions have been created for this purpose; in others, established agencies—usually legislative councils—will do the job. It is to be hoped that the current efforts will be more successful than were those made thirty-seven years ago when many of the states established temporary survey commissions patterned after President Taft's Commission on Economy and Efficiency of 1912 which tried to put the federal government of that day on a more businesslike basis.

A national conference on state reorganization problems, held in Chicago, Illinois, September 29-30, 1949, should contribute to this end. The conference, held under the auspices of the Council of State Governments, brought together chairmen, members, and/or staff directors of twenty of the state commissions or agencies responsible for current state studies. The meeting provided an opportunity to discuss mutual problems and exchange experience as an aid in planning and carrying through programs.

I

THE current movement for reorganization may be said to have gotten under way in 1948 in New Jersey, Kentucky, and South Carolina, whose legislatures were among the ten meeting in the "off year."¹ It has gone for-

ward with speed in 1949, with strong leadership from governors and state legislators who felt that the time was propitious to press for the reorganization of antiquated administrative structures. Governors of ten states in either regular or special messages to their legislatures in 1949 called for legislative investigations or special surveys of the administrative machinery of their states.

These messages pointed to special problems and needed changes in the organization and management of state government. For example, the Governor of Wisconsin, Oscar Rennebohm, in a special message to the legislature, stated: "Although the Governor is charged generally with the duty of providing for the state efficient, economical and vigorous enforcement of its laws, four important departments are wholly beyond his directing power. Three of these departments, those headed by the secretary of state, treasurer, and attorney general are not policy-making agencies in any

one hundred independent agencies and departments have been reorganized into fourteen principal departments. See Leslie Lipson, "The Executive Branch in New State Constitutions," 9 *Public Administration Review* 11-21 (Winter, 1949); C. Wesley Armstrong, Jr., "Administrative Reorganization in New Jersey," 21 *State Government* 244-47, 254-55. (December, 1948). Special studies of local government and state-local relations in New Jersey are currently being made.

The principal action in Kentucky was the reorganization of state welfare activities and the establishment of a Legislative Research Commission with authority, funds, and staff to undertake detailed studies of governmental needs.

In South Carolina a State Reorganization Commission was established which is now engaged in preparing recommendations for the next Legislature.

For a summary review of recent state action to improve governmental structure and administration, see Lynton K. Caldwell, "Perfecting State Administration, 1940-46," 7 *Public Administration Review* 25-36 (Winter, 1947).

¹In New Jersey the Legislature, cooperating with Governor Driscoll, carried out the mandate of the Constitution of 1947 which prescribed an upper limit of twenty principal state government departments. Nearly

real sense of the term. . . . The two year term of the Governor is another strong deterrent to effective direction of the state administrative machinery. . . ." He proposed that the Constitution be amended to increase the terms of the Governor and lieutenant-governor from two to four years and to provide for appointment by the Governor, rather than election, of the secretary of state, treasurer, and attorney general.

In general the enabling acts or legislative resolutions for state administrative surveys have been drafted in broad terms. Survey commissions or agencies have been directed to study the organization and operation of government departments and agencies, investigate costs and services, and make recommendations to achieve economy and efficiency in the administration of state functions. The resolution of the California Senate is typical:

The Senate Interim Committee on Governmental Reorganization is hereby created and authorized and directed to ascertain, study and analyze all facts relating to the organization, functions, procedures and operations of the State Government and the departments and agencies thereof, the relationship between such departments and agencies and the internal organization and methods of operation thereof, their cost to the State, the necessity or desirability of their continuance, the existence of overlapping or needless functions, the desirability of centralizing and coordinating related activities and modernizing techniques and procedures, and all facts relating to the nature, extent, efficiency and economy of governmental activities and operations, including but not limited to the operation, effect, administration, enforcement and needed revision of any and all laws in any way bearing upon or relating to the subject of this resolution, and to report thereon to the Senate, including in the reports its recommendations for appropriate legislation.

Agencies undertaking the surveys are of two general types: (1) commissions or committees established especially for the purpose, and (2) existing agencies, usually legislative councils.² The following seventeen states have created commissions or committees:

² Because their investigations have a close relationship to governmental organization and efficiency, mention should be made of the fact that twelve states are currently undertaking special studies of tax and fiscal problems: Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Maryland, Michi-

Arizona
California³
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Idaho
Illinois
Iowa
Massachusetts

Michigan
Minnesota
New Jersey
New York
New Hampshire
Ohio
Oregon
South Carolina

Ten states have given the assignment to legislative councils or other established state agencies:⁴

Florida
Kentucky
Nebraska
Nevada
North Dakota

Oklahoma
Pennsylvania
Tennessee
Texas
Wisconsin

Surveys are also going forward in Hawaii and Puerto Rico. In Hawaii the Legislature has established a Committee on Governmental Efficiency with an appropriation of \$150,000. In the course of its work it plans to send representatives, including its director of research, to the continental United States to study and report on developments. Puerto Rico has set up a 7-member Commission on Reorganization financed by a \$75,000 appropriation. Its president is James H. Rowe, Jr., a member of the Hoover Commission. Louis Brownlow, who was chairman of the President's Committee on Administrative Management, is also a

gan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.

³ In California three legislative committees are concerned with problems of government organization and administration—the Senate and House Interim Committees on Governmental Reorganization and the Assembly Interim Committee on Governmental Efficiency. All three committees are given broad powers of investigation.

⁴ Legislative councils, which now exist in twenty-three states, are essentially permanent joint legislative committees vested with authority to study subjects of interest to their respective legislatures and having the services of a research staff. The councils in Florida and Texas were established in 1949. A principal reason for their establishment was the need for a state agency to undertake reorganization surveys. The act establishing the Texas Council provides (Sec. 3) that it shall have authority: "(a) To investigate departments, agencies and officers of the State and to study their functions and problems; (b) To make studies for the use of the legislative branch of the State Government." S. B. 316 (51st Texas Legislature, 1949).

member. Other members are Puerto Ricans with wide experience in public affairs.

State commissions or committees vary in size from three members in South Carolina to twenty-one members in Ohio. The typical commission has nine members—three from each house of the legislature and three citizen members selected by the governor. Some commissions, however, consist entirely of lay or citizen members; others are entirely legislative.

Appropriations for the work of commissions run from nominal amounts to cover the travel and incidental expenses of commission members in two or three of the states to \$110,000 for the work of the three committees in California and \$100,000 for the commission set up in Massachusetts. Other states with substantial appropriations are: New York, \$60,000; Ohio, \$60,000; Connecticut, \$50,000; Illinois, \$50,000; Iowa, \$30,000, and Oregon, \$30,000. It is impossible to forecast the amounts the various legislative councils will allocate from their total budgets to their administrative surveys. Budgets of the councils range from \$11,000 for the biennium in Kentucky to \$150,000 in Texas. It may be estimated, however, that at least \$1,000,000 will be spent on administrative surveys by the states in the next two years.

II

THE meeting in Chicago, September 29-30, which brought together representatives from twenty of the state commissions and councils, should be of aid in the wise spending of these funds. One of the purposes of the meeting—pointed out by its chairman, Frank Bane, executive director of the Council of State Governments, in the opening session—was to make available to those present the wisdom already gained in work of this kind. Some of those present were from states already well embarked on their programs; others were from states in the early stages of organizing their work. In addition to representatives from the states, several persons with experience as members or advisers of administrative survey commissions were present to participate in the discussion: Luther H. Gulick, president of the Institute of Public Administration; Herman G. Pope, executive director of Public Administration Service; Lewis Meriam, vice-president of the Brookings Institution; and Arthur S.

Flemming, president of Ohio Wesleyan University and a member of the Hoover Commission. Another purpose of the meeting was to determine what materials the Council of State Governments might provide the several states in order to avoid duplicating work.

While the composition of the commissions represented at the conference had been established, the group felt that a discussion of values of various types of membership might be useful in pointing up problems and aiding in future work. Arguments in favor of the lay type of commission were that it would be independent, aloof from partisan interests, and of a stature to command the respect of the entire public. A legislative commission might be affected by the political predilections of its members or their local commitments and interests. On the other hand, legislative members presumably would have more background and a better knowledge of existing state problems. They might also prove of value in interpreting the findings of the commission to their colleagues and in sponsoring bills needed to carry out commission recommendations.

At the end of the discussion of this subject it was the consensus of the group that the merits of each type might well be achieved in a mixed commission made up of members of the legislature and of representatives of the public appointed by the governor. This type of commission has been appointed in Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and South Carolina.

It was generally agreed that the task force method used by the Hoover Commission would be impractical except possibly in the larger states. A survey of that type would require not only a very substantial appropriation, but also the leadership of a person with the knowledge of, and the stature in, state affairs that Mr. Hoover possesses in national.

The discussion of the scope of the work the commissions and councils should undertake was especially valuable. The legislative mandate to present commissions is in most instances general and they are largely free to determine their work programs within the limits of their resources. There was general agreement that the surveys should deal only with organizational and administrative problems—that they should keep free of policy

questions which are the province of the legislature. It was recognized, of course, that it is not always easy to draw the line between the two kinds of questions. The surveys should also be concerned with top-level problems of organization and administration—they should not be distracted by specific tax and fiscal problems and they should not become involved in the minutiae of organization or the details of procedures. A report concerned with the larger problems and principles of organization and management has a much better chance of adoption than a report concerned with details. Surveys might well extend to problems of legislative and judicial organization and administration. They might well also include federal-state and state-local relationships. A general conditioning factor is, of course, the scope of survey that may be undertaken with a reasonable promise of success. Project priorities should be determined, not by the survey staff, but by the commission members, particularly those with political sagacity.

The value to a commission of a full-time professional director of research was stressed. He will usually need the services of a qualified technical staff independent of the local administration.

In carrying forward the work of the commissions, stock should first be taken of the resources available locally. Only after such a canvass will a commission be in a position to know what outside help it will need and how it may best budget its funds. Almost all of the commissions are authorized to request assistance from state departments and agencies and state educational institutions. Private research agencies and educational institutions will also in many instances be able and willing to give assistance. Some commissions will find it advisable to engage the services of private administrative consulting and survey organizations and engineering management firms for some parts of their survey work.

It is important to examine any earlier surveys and management studies that may have been made and shelved. Often much can be learned from previous failures. Much can be learned, too, from the experience of other states with similar surveys.

In the course of the survey it may be advis-

able to interview leaders of special groups—labor unions, taxpayers organizations, farmer organizations, and the like. Such meetings can yield useful information and build good will.

Survey reports should be accurate, well organized, compact, readable, and attractive. It may be desirable to summarize the principal findings and recommendations at the beginning of the report in order to give the reader a quick introduction to it. If recommendations are based on detailed findings it may be well to present these details in an appendix, including in the main report only major points. Commissions should consider issuing brief summary reports in attractive format for popular consumption.

A commission must guard against political "boners" in its report. Often entire reports have failed because of some minor recommendation that was politically unwise. Again, opposition has been aroused by examples that were not at all necessary to the substance of the report. Pointed examples can add strength to a report, but they must be wisely chosen. Unanimity should be reached in the commission and strong public support assured before certain types of recommendations are made—for example, that an elective head of the department of agriculture, or commerce, or labor be made appointive.

The conference discussed the various publics to which a survey report must be sold. One important public is, of course, the legislature, for legislative action will doubtless be needed to carry out some of the major survey recommendations. Legislative members on the commission may take the leadership in presenting the report to their colleagues and in introducing, explaining, and defending the necessary bills. If there are no legislators on the commission, or if such members do not wish to support the needed legislation, administration leaders in the legislature will need to take the initiative.

Executive support and leadership are also necessary in carrying out the recommendations of the survey report, especially the leadership of the governor. The surveys that have been most successful have had strong executive support. The job of selling begins, of course, where research begins—in the departments and

agencies—and close contacts should be maintained with them at all times.

The report must also be sold to the public. The appointment of public support committees composed of strong lay members—newspaper publishers, representatives of labor, agriculture, and industry, educators, and so on—has been tried with success in many states. The governor may hold press conferences to interpret the findings to the public; it is important to make careful preparation for such conferences. The report may be featured in local radio programs. It is also desirable to hold public hearings—first to explain and interpret the survey and second to bring out criticisms that must be met. Local people, not outside agencies, should take the responsibility for presenting the report to the public.

As a part of the selling job, the conference discussed whether the report should be presented to a special or a regular session of the legislature. Both methods have been tried successfully. A special session may attract too much attention to the report, giving "snipers" a chance to concentrate their fire at a time when there are no other issues before the legislature to command attention. If the report is considered at the same time that the budget and state policies generally are examined, the legislatures will have a better balanced picture of the state's needs and resources.

It is important to lay plans for following up on commission recommendations. In some instances it may be advisable to make the services of the survey staff available for six months or a year beyond the time the report is made. An administrative management division established in the executive department has rendered valuable service in several states. Legislative councils may be given the job of helping to put into effect the survey's recommendations. The staffs of legislative appropriation committees may also be helpful.

III

THROUGHOUT the conference, it was made abundantly clear that if state government is to function effectively, the governor must be in fact the chief executive. He must be clothed with sufficient authority and given the necessary managerial tools with which to work.

While there was some defense of the plan used in Wisconsin under which the Governor appoints boards and commissions which in turn select department heads, a strong case was made for appointment of department heads by the governor. The first obligation of government is to be responsive to the will of the people. A responsible executive is a principal means to this end.

Certain other ideas also permeated the conference. It was recognized, for example, that state reorganization is a continuing problem, but that there is also great virtue in making a general survey at least once in a generation—and more often if significant changes are taking place in the state. Also, there recurred frequently the idea that while it is possible to make generalizations as to best practices in state government organization and administration, the recommendations for each state will have to be tailored to its particular situation.

In a concluding statement, the chairman of the conference pointed out that the effective organization of a state government can result in considerable savings. More important, however, is the need to make state government work. It is significant that more than half of the states are at the present time taking positive action to strengthen their governments; such strengthening is needed to preserve our democratic institutions and make our federal system work.

State governments, like the federal government, have expanded and in a hit-and-miss fashion. The present reorganization movement, instigated by governors and state legislators throughout the country, can make a great contribution to better and more effective government. Administrative surveys are good for state government and good for the taxpayer, for he will find out where his money is going. Expectations of large savings may, however, result in disappointments; administrative surveys in the past have not been outstanding in their money-saving achievements. On this point, it will be well to remember the statement of one governor who, on taking office, pledged his legislature that "he would administer the state government in such a way as to get a dollar's worth of government for each dollar's worth of taxes paid." No one could ask for more!

Power and Administration

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I

THERE is no more forlorn spectacle in the administrative world than an agency and a program possessed of statutory life, armed with executive orders, sustained in the courts, yet stricken with paralysis and deprived of power. An object of contempt to its enemies and of despair to its friends.

The lifeblood of administration is power. Its attainment, maintenance, increase, dissipation, and loss are subjects the practitioner and student can ill afford to neglect. Loss of realism and failure are almost certain consequences. This is not to deny that important parts of public administration are so deeply entrenched in the habits of the community, so firmly supported by the public, or so clearly necessary as to be able to take their power base for granted and concentrate on the purely professional side of their problems. But even these islands of the blessed are not immune from the plague of politics, as witness the fate of the hapless Bureau of Labor Statistics and the perennial menace of the blind 5 per cent across-the-board budget cut. Perhaps Carlyle's aphorism holds here, "The healthy know not of their health but only the sick." To stay healthy one needs to recognize that health is a fruit, not a birthright. Power is only one of the considerations that must be weighed in administration, but of all it is the most overlooked in theory and the most dangerous to overlook in practice.

The power resources of an administrator or an agency are not disclosed by a legal search of titles and court decisions or by examining appropriations or budgetary allotments. Legal authority and a treasury balance are necessary but politically insufficient bases of administration. Administrative rationality requires a

critical evaluation of the whole range of complex and shifting forces on whose support, acquiescence, or temporary impotence the power to act depends.

Analysis of the sources from which power is derived and the limitations they impose is as much a dictate of prudent administration as sound budgetary procedure. The bankruptcy that comes from an unbalanced power budget has consequences far more disastrous than the necessity of seeking a deficiency appropriation. The budgeting of power is a basic subject matter of a realistic science of administration.

It may be urged that for all but the top hierarchy of the administrative structure the question of power is irrelevant. Legislative authority and administrative orders suffice. Power adequate to the function to be performed flows down the chain of command. Neither statute nor executive order, however, confers more than legal authority to act. Whether Congress or President can impart the substance of power as well as the form depends upon the line-up of forces in the particular case. A price control law wrung from a reluctant Congress by an amorphous and unstable combination of consumer and labor groups is formally the same as a law enacting a support price program for agriculture backed by the disciplined organizations of farmers and their congressmen. The differences for the scope and effectiveness of administration are obvious. The Presidency, like Congress, responds to and translates the pressures that play upon it. The real mandate contained in an Executive order varies with the political strength of the group demand embodied in it, and in the context of other group demands.

Both Congress and President do focus the

general political energies of the community and so are considerably more than mere means for transmitting organized pressures. Yet power is not concentrated by the structure of government or politics into the hands of a leadership with a capacity to budget it among a diverse set of administrative activities. A picture of the Presidency as a reservoir of authority from which the lower echelons of administration draw life and vigor is an idealized distortion of reality.

A similar criticism applies to any like claim for an agency head in his agency. Only in varying degrees can the powers of subordinate officials be explained as resulting from the chain of command. Rarely is such an explanation a satisfactory account of the sources of power.

To deny that power is derived exclusively from superiors in the hierarchy is to assert that subordinates stand in a feudal relation in which to a degree they fend for themselves and acquire support peculiarly their own. A structure of interests friendly or hostile, vague and general or compact and well-defined, encloses each significant center of administrative discretion. This structure is an important determinant of the scope of possible action. As a source of power and authority it is a competitor of the formal hierarchy.

Not only does political power flow in from the sides of an organization, as it were; it also flows up the organization to the center from the constituent parts. When the staff of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion advised a hard-pressed agency to go out and get itself some popular support so that the President could afford to support it, their action reflected the realities of power rather than political cynicism.

It is clear that the American system of politics does not generate enough power at any focal point of leadership to provide the conditions for an even partially successful divorce of politics from administration. Subordinates cannot depend on the formal chain of command to deliver enough political power to permit them to do their jobs. Accordingly they must supplement the resources available through the hierarchy with those they can muster on their own, or accept the conse-

quences in frustration—a course itself not without danger. Administrative rationality demands that objectives be determined and sights set in conformity with a realistic appraisal of power position and potential.

II

THE theory of administration has neglected the problem of the sources and adequacy of power, in all probability because of a distaste for the disorderliness of American political life and a belief that this disorderliness is transitory. An idealized picture of the British parliamentary system as a Platonic form to be realized or approximated has exerted a baneful fascination in the field. The majority party with a mandate at the polls and a firmly seated leadership in the Cabinet seems to solve adequately the problem of the supply of power necessary to permit administration to concentrate on the fulfillment of accepted objectives. It is a commonplace that the American party system provides neither a mandate for a platform nor a mandate for a leadership.

Accordingly, the election over, its political meaning must be explored by the diverse leaders in the executive and legislative branches. Since the parties have failed to discuss issues, mobilize majorities in their terms, and create a working political consensus on measures to be carried out, the task is left for others—most prominently the agencies concerned. Legislation passed and powers granted are frequently politically premature. Thus the Council of Economic Advisers was given legislative birth before political acceptance of its functions existed. The agencies to which tasks are assigned must devote themselves to the creation of an adequate consensus to permit administration. The mandate that the parties do not supply must be attained through public relations and the mobilization of group support. Pendleton Herring and others have shown just how vital this support is for agency action.

The theory that agencies should confine themselves to communicating policy suggestions to executive and legislature, and refrain from appealing to their clientele and the public, neglects the failure of the parties to provide either a clear-cut decision as to what they

should do or an adequately mobilized political support for a course of action. The bureaucracy under the American political system has a large share of responsibility for the public promotion of policy and even more in organizing the political basis for its survival and growth. It is generally recognized that the agencies have a special competence in the technical aspects of their fields which of necessity gives them a rightful policy initiative. In addition, they have or develop a shrewd understanding of the politically feasible in the group structure within which they work. Above all, in the eyes of their supporters and their enemies they represent the institutionalized embodiment of policy, an enduring organization actually or potentially capable of mobilizing power behind policy. The survival interests and creative drives of administrative organizations combine with clientele pressures to compel such mobilization. The party system provides no enduring institutional representation for group interest at all comparable to that of the bureaus of the Department of Agriculture. Even the subject matter committees of Congress function in the shadow of agency permanency.

The bureaucracy is recognized by all interested groups as a major channel of representation to such an extent that Congress rightly feels the competition of a rival. The weakness in party structure both permits and makes necessary the present dimensions of the political activities of the administrative branch—permits because it fails to protect administration from pressures and fails to provide adequate direction and support, makes necessary because it fails to develop a consensus on a leadership and a program that makes possible administration on the basis of accepted decisional premises.

Agencies and bureaus more or less perforce are in the business of building, maintaining, and increasing their political support. They lead and in large part are led by the diverse groups whose influence sustains them. Frequently they lead and are themselves led in conflicting directions. This is not due to a dull-witted incapacity to see the contradictions in their behavior but is an almost inevitable result of the contradictory nature of their support.

Herbert Simon has shown that administrative rationality depends on the establishment of uniform value premises in the decisional centers of organization. Unfortunately, the value premises of those forming vital elements of political support are often far from uniform. These elements are in Barnard's and Simon's sense "customers" of the organization and therefore parts of the organization whose wishes are clothed with a very real authority. A major and most time-consuming aspect of administration consists of the wide range of activities designed to secure enough "customer" acceptance to survive and, if fortunate, develop a consensus adequate to program formulation and execution.

To varying degrees, dependent on the breadth of acceptance of their programs, officials at every level of significant discretion must make their estimates of the situation, take stock of their resources, and plan accordingly. A keen appreciation of the real components of their organization is the beginning of wisdom. These components will be found to stretch far beyond the government payroll. Within the government they will encompass Congress, congressmen, committees, courts, other agencies, presidential advisers, and the President. The Aristotelian analysis of constitutions is equally applicable and equally necessary to an understanding of administrative organization.

The broad alliance of conflicting groups that makes up presidential majorities scarcely coheres about any definite pattern of objectives, nor has it by the alchemy of the party system had its collective power concentrated in an accepted leadership with a personal mandate. The conciliation and maintenance of this support is a necessary condition of the attainment and retention of office involving, as Madison so well saw, "the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of government." The President must in large part be, if not all things to all men, at least many things to many men. As a consequence, the contradictions in his power base invade administration. The often criticized apparent cross-purposes of the Roosevelt regime cannot be put down to inept administration until the political facts are weighed. Were these apparently self-defeating

measures reasonably related to the general maintenance of the composite majority of the Administration? The first objective—ultimate patriotism apart—of the administrator is the attainment and retention of the power on which his tenure of office depends. This is the necessary pre-condition for the accomplishment of all other objectives.

The same ambiguities that arouse the scorn of the naive in the electoral campaigns of the parties are equally inevitable in administration and for the same reasons. Victory at the polls does not yield either a clear-cut grant of power or a unified majority support for a coherent program. The task of the Presidency lies in feeling out the alternatives of policy which are consistent with the retention and increase of the group support on which the Administration rests. The lack of a budgetary theory (so frequently deplored) is not due to any incapacity to apply rational analysis to the comparative contribution of the various activities of government to a determinate hierarchy of purposes. It more probably stems from a fastidious distaste for the frank recognition of the budget as a politically expedient allocation of resources. Appraisal in terms of their political contribution to the Administration provides almost a sole common denominator between the Forest Service and the Bureau of Engraving.

Integration of the administrative structure through an over-all purpose in terms of which tasks and priorities can be established is an emergency phenomenon. Its realization, only partial at best, has been limited to war and the extremity of depression. Even in wartime the Farm Bureau Federation, the American Federation of Labor, the Congress of Industrial Organizations, the National Association of Manufacturers, the Chamber of Commerce, and a host of lesser interests resisted coordination of themselves and the agencies concerned with their interests. A Presidency temporarily empowered by intense mass popular support acting in behalf of a generally accepted and simplified purpose can, with great difficulty, bribe, cajole, and coerce a real measure of joint action. The long-drawn-out battle for conversion and the debacle of orderly reconversion underline the difficulty of attaining, and the transitory nature of, popu-

larly based emergency power. Only in crises are the powers of the Executive nearly adequate to impose a common plan of action on the executive branch, let alone the economy.

In ordinary times the manifold pressures of our pluralistic society work themselves out in accordance with the balance of forces prevailing in Congress and the agencies. Only to a limited degree is the process subject to responsible direction or review by President or party leadership.

The program of the President cannot be a Gosplan for the government precisely because the nature of his institutional and group support gives him insufficient power. The personal unity of the Presidency cannot perform the function of Hobbes' sovereign since his office lacks the authority of Hobbes' contract. Single headedness in the executive gives no assurance of singleness of purpose. It only insures that the significant pressures in a society will be brought to bear on one office. Monarchy solves the problem of giving one plan to a multitude only when the plenitude of its authority approaches dictatorship. Impatient social theorists in all ages have turned to the philosopher king as a substitute for consensus. Whatever else he may become, it is difficult to conceive of the American president ruling as a philosopher king, even with the advice of the Executive Office. The monarchical solution to the administrative problems posed by the lack of a disciplined party system capable of giving firm leadership and a program to the legislature is a modern variant of the dreams of the eighteenth century savants and well nigh equally divorced from a realistic appraisal of social realities.

Much of administrative thought, when it does not assume the value of coordination for coordination's sake, operates on the assumption that there must be something akin to Rousseau's *volonté générale* in administration to which the errant *volonté de tous* of the bureaus can and should be made to conform. This will-o'-the-wisp was made the object of an illuminating search by Pendleton Herring in his *Public Administration and the Public Interest*. The answer for Rousseau was enlightened dictatorship or counting the votes. The administrative equivalent to the latter is the resultant of the relevant pressures, as Her-

ring shows. The first alternative seems to require at least the potency of the British Labour party and elsewhere has needed the disciplined organization of a fascist, nazi, or communist party to provide the power and consensus necessary to coordinate the manifold activities of government to a common plan.

Dictatorship, as Sigmund Neumann has observed, is a substitute for institutions which is required to fill the vacuum when traditional institutions break down. Force supplies the compulsion and guide to action in place of the normal routines of unconscious habit. Administrative organizations, however much they may appear the creations of art, are institutions produced in history and woven in the web of social relationships that gives them life and being. They present the same refractory material to the hand of the political artist as the rest of society of which they form a part.

Just as the economists have attempted to escape the complexities of institutional reality by taking refuge in the frictionless realm of theory, so some students of administration, following their lead, have seen in the application of the doctrine of opportunity costs a clue to a science of administration. Valuable as this may be in a restricted way, Marx has more light to throw on the study of institutions. It is in the dynamics and interrelations of institutions that we have most hope of describing and therefore learning to control administrative behavior.

III

THE difficulty of coordinating government agencies lies not only in the fact that bureaucratic organizations are institutions having survival interests which may conflict with their rational adaptation to over-all purpose, but even more in their having roots in society. Coordination of the varied activities of a modern government almost of necessity involves a substantial degree of coordination of the economy. Coordination of government agencies involves far more than changing the behavior and offices of officials in Washington and the field. It involves the publics that are implicated in their normal functioning. To coordinate fiscal policy, agricultural policy, labor policy, foreign policy, and military pol-

icy, to name a few major areas, moves beyond the range of government charts and the habitat of the bureaucrats to the market place and to where the people live and work. This suggests that the reason why government reorganization is so difficult is that far more than government in the formal sense is involved in reorganization. One could overlook this in the limited government of the nineteenth century but the multi-billion dollar government of the mid-twentieth permits no facile dichotomy between government and economy. Economy and efficiency are the two objectives a laissez faire society can prescribe in peacetime as over-all government objectives. Their inadequacy either as motivation or standards has long been obvious. A planned economy clearly requires a planned government. But, if one can afford an unplanned economy, apart from gross extravagance, there seems no compelling and therefore, perhaps, no sufficiently powerful reason for a planned government.

Basic to the problem of administrative rationality is that of organizational identification and point of view. To whom is one loyal—unit, section, branch, division, bureau, department, administration, government, country, people, world history, or what? Administrative analysis frequently assumes that organizational identification should occur in such a way as to merge primary organization loyalty in a larger synthesis. The good of the part is to give way to the reasoned good of the whole. This is most frequently illustrated in the rationalizations used to counter self-centered demands of primary groups for funds and personnel. Actually the competition between governmental power centers, rather than the rationalizations, is the effective instrument of coordination.

Where there is a clear common product on whose successful production the sub-groups depend for the attainment of their own satisfaction, it is possible to demonstrate to almost all participants the desirability of cooperation. The shoe factory produces shoes, or else, for all concerned. But the government as a whole and many of its component parts have no such identifiable common product on which all depend. Like the proverbial Heinz, there are fifty-seven or more varieties unified, if at all, by a common political profit and loss account.

Administration is faced by somewhat the same dilemma as economics. There are propositions about the behavior patterns conducive to full employment—welfare economics. On the other hand, there are propositions about the economics of the individual firm—the counsel of the business schools. It is possible to show with considerable persuasiveness that sound considerations for the individual firm may lead to a depression if generally adopted, a result desired by none of the participants. However, no single firm can afford by itself to adopt the course of collective wisdom; in the absence of a common power capable of enforcing decisions premised on the supremacy of the collective interest, *saute qui peut* is common sense.

The position of administrative organizations is not unlike the position of particular firms. Just as the decisions of the firms could be coordinated by the imposition of a planned economy so could those of the component parts of the government. But just as it is possible to operate a formally unplanned economy by the loose coordination of the market, in the same fashion it is possible to operate a government by the loose coordination of the play of political forces through its institutions.

The unseen hand of Adam Smith may be little in evidence in either case. One need not believe in a doctrine of social or administrative harmony to believe that formal centralized planning—while perhaps desirable and in some cases necessary—is not a must. The complicated logistics of supplying the city of New York runs smoothly down the grooves of millions of well adapted habits projected from a distant past. It seems naive on the one hand to believe in the possibility of a vast, intricate, and delicate economy operating with a minimum of formal over-all direction, and on the other to doubt that a relatively simple mechanism such as the government can be controlled largely by the same play of forces.

Doubtless the real reasons for seeking coordination in the government are the same that prompt a desire for economic planning. In fact, apart from waging war with its demand for rapid change, economic planning would seem to be the only objective sufficiently compelling and extensive to require a drastic change in our system of political *laissez faire*. Harold Smith, testifying before the Senate

Banking and Currency Committee on the Employment Act of 1946, showed how extensive a range of hitherto unrelated activities could be brought to bear on a common purpose—the maintenance of maximum employment and purchasing power. In the flush of the war experience and with prophecies of reconversion unemployment, a reluctant Congress passed a pious declaration of policy. Senator Flanders has recorded the meager showing to date.

Nevertheless, war and depression apart, the Employment Act of 1946 for the first time provides an inclusive common purpose in terms of which administrative activities can be evaluated and integrated. While still deficient in depth and content, it provides at least a partial basis for the rational budgeting of government activities. The older concept of economy and efficiency as autonomous standards still lingers in Congress, but elsewhere their validity as ends in themselves is treated with skepticism.

If the advent of Keynesian economics and the erosion of *laissez faire* have created the intellectual conditions requisite for the formulation of over-all government policy, they do not by any means guarantee the political conditions necessary for its implementation. We can see quite clearly that the development of an integrated administration requires an integrating purpose. The ideals of Locke, Smith, Spencer, and their American disciples deny the need for such a purpose save for economy and efficiency's sake. Marx, Keynes, and their followers by denying the validity of the self-regulating economy have endowed the state with an over-arching responsibility in terms of which broad coordination of activities is not only intellectually possible but theoretically, at least, necessary. Intellectual perception of the need for this coordination, however, has run well ahead of the public's perception of it and of the development of a political channeling of power adequate to its administrative implementation.

Most students of administration are planners of some sort. Most congressmen would fly the label like the plague. Most bureaucrats, whatever their private faith, live under two jealous gods, their particular clientele and the loyalty check. Such a condition might, if it exists as described, cast doubt on whether even the intellectual conditions for rational admin-

istrative coordination exist. Be that as it may, the transition from a government organized in clientele departments and bureaus, each responding to the massive feudal power of organized business, organized agriculture, and organized labor, to a government integrated about a paramount national purpose will require a political power at least as great as that which tamed the earlier feudalism. It takes a sharp eye or a tinted glass to see such an organized power on the American scene. Without it, administrative organization for over-all coordination has the academic air of South American constitution making. One is reminded of the remark attributed to the Austrian economist Mises; on being told that the facts did not agree with his theory, he replied "*desto schlechter für die Tatsache.*"

IV

It is highly appropriate to consider how administrators should behave to meet the test of efficiency in a planned polity; but in the absence of such a polity and while, if we like, struggling to get it, a realistic science of administration will teach administrative behavior appropriate to the existing political system.

A close examination of the presidential system may well bring one to conclude that administrative rationality in it is a different matter from that applicable to the British ideal. The American Presidency is an office that has significant monarchical characteristics despite its limited term and elective nature. The literature on court and palace has many an insight applicable to the White House. Access to the President, reigning favorites, even the court jester, are topics that show the continuity of institutions. The maxims of LaRochefoucauld and the memoirs of the Duc de Saint Simon have a refreshing realism for the operator on the Potomac.

The problem of rival factions in the President's family is as old as the famous struggle between Jefferson and Hamilton, as fresh and modern as the latest cabal against John Snyder. Experience seems to show that this personal and factional struggle for the President's favor is a vital part of the process of representation. The vanity, personal ambition, or patriotism of the contestants soon clothes itself in the generalities of principle and the clique aligns itself with groups beyond the capital. Subor-

dinate rivalry is tolerated if not encouraged by so many able executives that it can scarcely be attributed to administrative ineptitude. The wrangling tests opinion, uncovers information that would otherwise never rise to the top, and provides effective opportunity for decision rather than mere ratification of pre-arranged plans. Like most judges, the Executive needs to hear argument for his own instruction. The alternatives presented by subordinates in large part determine the freedom and the creative opportunity of their superiors. The danger of becoming a Merovingian is a powerful incentive to the maintenance of fluidity in the structure of power.

The fixed character of presidential tenure makes it necessary that subordinates be politically expendable. The President's men must be willing to accept the blame for failures not their own. Machiavelli's teaching on how princes must keep the faith bears re-reading. Collective responsibility is incompatible with a fixed term of office. As it tests the currents of public opinion, the situation on the Hill, and the varying strength of the organized pressures, the White House alters and adapts the complexion of the Administration. Loyalties to programs or to groups and personal pride and interest frequently conflict with whole-souled devotion to the Presidency. In fact, since such devotion is not made mandatory by custom, institutions, or the facts of power, the problem is perpetually perplexing to those who must choose.

The balance of power between executive and legislature is constantly subject to the shifts of public and group support. The latent tendency of the American Congress is to follow the age-old parliamentary precedents and to try to reduce the President to the role of constitutional monarch. Against this threat and to secure his own initiative, the President's resources are primarily demagogic, with the weaknesses and strengths that dependence on mass popular appeal implies. The unanswered question of American government—"who is boss?"—constantly plagues administration. The disruption of unity of command is not just the problem of Taylor's functional foreman, but goes to the stability and uniformity of basic decisional premises essential to consequent administration.

It is interesting to speculate on the conse-

quences for administration of the full development of congressional or presidential government. A leadership in Congress that could control the timetable of the House and Senate would scarcely content itself short of reducing the President's Cabinet to what in all probability it was first intended to be, a modified version of the present Swiss executive. Such leadership could scarcely arise without centrally organized, disciplined, national parties far different from our present shambling alliances of state and local machines.

A Presidency backed by a disciplined party controlling a majority in Congress would probably assimilate itself to a premiership by association of legislative leadership in the formulation of policy and administration. In either line of development the crucial matter is party organization. For the spirit of the party system determines the character of the government.

That the American party system will develop toward the British ideal is by no means a foregone conclusion. The present oscillation between a strong demagogic Presidency and a defensively powerful congressional oligarchy may well prove a continuing pattern of American politics, as it was of Roman. In the absence of a party system providing an institutionalized centripetal force in our affairs, it is natural to look to the Presidency as Goldsmith's weary traveler looked to the throne.

The Presidency of the United States, however, is no such throne as the pre-World War I *Kaiserreich* that provided the moral and political basis for the Prussian bureaucracy. Lacking neutrality and mystique, it does not even perform the function of the British monarchy in providing a psychological foundation for the permanent civil service. A leaderless and irresponsible Congress frequently makes it appear the strong point of the republic. The Bonapartist experience in France, the Weimar

Republic, and South American examples nearer home, despite important social differences, are relevant to any thoughtful consideration of building a solution to legislative anarchy on the unity of the executive.

The present course of American party development gives little ground for optimism that a responsible two party system capable of uniting Congress and Executive in a coherent program will emerge. The increasingly critical importance of the federal budget for the national economy and the inevitable impact of world power status on the conduct of foreign affairs make inescapable the problem of stable leadership in the American system. Unfortunately they by no means insure a happy or indeed any solution.

Attempts to solve administrative problems in isolation from the structure of power and purpose in the polity are bound to prove illusory. The reorganization of Congress to create responsibility in advance of the development of party responsibility was an act of piety to principle, of educational value; but as a practical matter it raised a structure without foundation. In the same way, reorganization of the executive branch to centralize administrative power in the Presidency while political power remains dispersed and divided may effect improvement, but in a large sense it must fail. The basic prerequisite to the administration of the textbooks is a responsible two party system. The means to its attainment are a number one problem for students of administration. What Schattschneider calls the struggle for party government may sometime yield us the responsible parliamentary two party system needed to underpin our present administrative theory. Until that happy time, exploration of the needs and necessities of our present system is a high priority task of responsible scholarship.

Conference Training in Federal Budgeting

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THE last few years have seen the development in the federal government of a new in-service training program devoted to the improvement of budget administration. This program brings together, in organized series of conferences, selected groups of federal employees engaged in budget work. The conferences cover the two broad phases of budget administration: one series deals with budget formulation, the other with budget execution.

The growth and operation of this training program are likely to be of interest not only to readers concerned with budgeting but also to others who need to keep in touch with various kinds of training experience. Perhaps the greatest significance of the program lies in the illustration it offers of the value of a sustained cooperative effort on the part of central staff agencies and line, or operating, agencies in designing and administering a system of training conferences. No less important is the program as a way of compensating for certain limitations that usually exist in the knowledge and experience of employees entering a specialized activity like budgeting. Because budget administration, in the federal government as elsewhere, is not a completely professionalized field, those working in it seldom combine theoretical and practical knowledge in a comprehensive sense. More often they will be thoroughly familiar only with one or another particular aspect.

Recognition of these limitations formed the starting point of the training program in budget administration. Such limitations are also present in many other specialized fields of public administration. It is therefore quite probable that the record of the program will provide information useful in the planning of similar training programs in other special-

ized fields, and also in other governmental jurisdictions.

Origin and Characteristics

ACTING upon a recommendation of the Federal Personnel Council, the United States Civil Service Commission, in August 1944, appointed an Advisory Committee on Management Training. The purpose of this committee was to assist the commission in developing training programs for staff employed in the various phases of management work. The committee felt that such programs should: (1) supplement, rather than replace, existing training facilities; (2) be of an in-service character, available to employees engaged in the respective management fields, and held on official time; (3) be generally coordinated by the Civil Service Commission on the basis of policy recommendations by the Advisory Committee; (4) receive technical guidance by the central staff agency principally active in the subject-matter area; and (5) be conducted in close cooperation with the operating agencies.

A subcommittee was appointed to work out a plan for such a training program in the field of budget administration. The subcommittee was composed of the late William A. Jump, director of finance, Department of Agriculture, and Donald C. Stone, then assistant director in charge of administrative management, Bureau of the Budget. In framing its plan, the subcommittee obtained the assistance of agency budget officers, staff of the Bureau of the Budget, and staff of the Civil Service Commission. The plan, readily accepted by the Advisory Committee, was welcomed by the agency budget officers, who promised leadership and support in carrying out the program. Likewise, the director of the Bureau of the Budget

offered staff resources for the preparation of training materials and related tasks. The first Conference on Budget Formulation was organized in February, 1945; the first Conference on Budget Execution, in May, 1947. It is interesting that the recommendations of the subcommittee were so well conceived that the practical test of later years furnished no reason for any basic change in the character of the conference program.

The need for a training program in budget administration was clearly indicated by the subcommittee in its report, submitted to the Advisory Committee in December, 1944. Federal budget personnel had been compelled to rely primarily on their individual efforts and experiences to improve their competence. Generally, such training as was offered by particular agencies had involved instruction in their own procedures, supplemented only in a few instances by general orientation in budgeting.

As Mr. Jump defined the goal for consideration by the subcommittee, a "Government-wide training course in the field of budgetary administration should be along practical but yet fundamental lines, since many persons serving in this field need more 'background' with respect to the basic objectives and potential utilization of the budget process as an instrument of orderly program planning, and as an instrument for management, in order to obtain greater efficiency and economy in the Federal service. It is believed that many of these employees see and experience only one part of the process as a reality and have never had adequate exposure to the process as a whole."

Proceeding along such lines, the subcommittee summed up the purpose of the training program as follows: "To (1) develop *skills* needed in the performance of specific processes and in the analysis, appraisal, and solution of budget problems; (2) provide *information* as to useful budget methods and processes; (3) offer sufficient *orientation* to make clear the significance of the processes considered; and (4) assure *indoctrination* in the potential significance of budgeting for management."

The division of the subject matter into the two main phases of budget formulation and budget execution was recognized in the two-

fold organization of the program. But the training approach is the same in both conference series. Each is organized to bring out basic processes; the statutory framework; legislative and executive policies, regulations, and procedures; principal techniques and their uses; agency methods which either succeed especially well in meeting general requirements or, as special methods for particular situations, admit of general application; and desirable administrative practices which facilitate budget work at the agency level.

The relation of budget administration to general management is stressed in both parts of the training program. The series of sessions on budget formulation, for instance, includes one session on program planning in relation to budget preparation, another on administrative planning, and still another on legislative treatment of the budget. The series on budget execution, in a similar manner, includes one session on replanning and scheduling the work program, and three sessions on how to use financial information, program and work data, and other information obtained through administrative surveys, technical inspections, and financial audits.

A training program must look to particular customers. This program was aimed at budget staff charged with technical, analytical, and advisory duties—generally excluding only the lowest and the very highest levels of responsibility. In other words, the program was not designed primarily for agency budget officers or for employees performing only routine processing operations. Occasionally individuals in other positions, like administrative analysts and administrative officers, have taken part in the program. In addition, each conference series has been attended by budget examiners of the Bureau of the Budget. Regardless of the positions they occupy, agency participants are designated by the budget officers. Each training group has included a few individuals so well versed in the subject matter as to be able to guide the discussion.

Because of the kind of participants envisaged and the contributions expected of them, the conference method of training was adopted as the most appropriate form. This decision in effect limited the size of each training group to about twenty. After some experimentation,

a series of twelve weekly meetings, each not longer than three and one-half hours, appeared best; such a schedule minimizes interference with regular duties, allows for adequate preparation, and provides sessions frequent enough to sustain interest.

The program has been administered continuously under the general guidance of a Conference Committee on Budgetary Administration, consisting of two agency budget officers, two members from the Bureau of the Budget, and one from the Civil Service Commission. The Conference Committee keeps in close touch with the program and serves as the board of directors. For example, it considers the organization of the subject matter of both the budget formulation and budget execution conferences, determines which conference series is to be given and how often, secures the services of chairmen and discussion leaders, and invites agency budget officers to nominate participants.

The preparation of the training materials, the planning for each conference series, and the handling of most of the administrative detail has been the responsibility of a few staff members in the Bureau of the Budget. This staff work has benefited not only from the attention of the Conference Committee but also from the steady interest shown by the Budget Officers Conference, a voluntary organization of federal agency budget officers. The Budget Officers Conference has proved a medium for concerted advisory assistance and support.

A special word should perhaps be said about the development of the training materials. The Bureau of the Budget had long been interested in the methods of budget formulation and budget execution applied by operating agencies. As a part of its continuing program to improve budget administration, and even before the idea of the training program had taken form, the bureau had set out to secure specific information about these methods. Interviews were held with budget officers and their principal assistants, pertinent materials were collected, and findings were summarized under a standard schedule of topics for the two main phases of the budget process. While there were also other uses of the findings in the bureau, this information provided a foundation for the development of session sub-

jects, outlines, and other materials distributed for the two conference series.

Training materials for each session fall into four general types: (1) outlines for the conference leaders, which break the subjects for the discussion into topics, list the points to be covered, and suggest methods of presentation; (2) less detailed outlines for participants, with questions for advance consideration and suggestions for supplementary reading; (3) selected reading matter so compiled as to supply background information, describe budgetary techniques in specific terms, and indicate particular problems; and (4) assignments for written work by participants about the practices of their own agencies. For each of the two conference series, the materials were tested in a trial run to determine any needs for expansion, modification, and rearrangement. Once the contents were well established, there remained the continuing task of revision as law and procedures change, and as desirable improvements were suggested.

Since the beginning of the program, there have been eighteen interdepartmental conference series—ten in budget formulation attended by 209 persons, and eight in budget execution attended by 167.

The Conference Method

THE conference method is a distinctive characteristic of the program. It takes the form of guided general discussion based on a prearranged order of topics. It was assumed at the outset that the participants in the training program would themselves carry the bulk of the discussion. Several reasons support this assumption.

In the first place, the participants are practitioners in budget work who collectively embody extensive practical experience. A rich background is provided to all by an interchange of information, ideas, observations, and points of view. Second, the interaction of different personalities is generally more stimulating than listening most of the time to speakers. A group of specialized employees, furthermore, usually has a greater range of specific knowledge and technical insight than any one individual. Third, the conference method overcomes formality. People get better acquainted and deal with one another more freely. They

also make lasting contacts, which are fruitful when advice may be needed as problems arise in the future, and which often bolster morale when unexpected difficulties can be shared. And fourth, if one takes an active part in a meeting, he generally feels more concerned with its outcome and more responsible for its success. He is therefore more likely to listen to suggestions arising from within the group; to analyze and evaluate them; to accept those in which the group concurs; and then to apply what he has learned to his own job.

The discussion method rests on a foundation of study materials to be examined in preparation for each meeting. Specific assignments are handed out which call for analyses of practices and problems in the participant's own agency. Occasionally, when it is felt that the group would benefit from the contribution of an especially qualified individual, or from an explanation of one agency's solution to a difficult problem, a guest speaker is invited. His presentation, too, is followed by questions and group discussion.

Because of the role played in the training program by group discussion, those responsible for the guidance of the discussion face a very important task. They must do all they can to create an environment favorable to free self-expression. The chairman, the discussion leaders, and the guest speakers are all able to help accomplish a high degree of group participation.

The chairman of each series of conferences is a budget officer on the departmental level. Occupying a key position in the top structure of a federal agency, he has a great deal of prestige among the participants, who tend to look to him for broad information and seasoned views. In order to stimulate group discussion, he must therefore consciously seek so to conduct himself that the group will not lean too heavily on him but will, nevertheless, receive the benefit of his personal contribution. Of course, he must always avoid dominating the group. Throughout the meetings he has to consider himself chiefly the moderator, easing the process of exchange, and indicating, if needed, the drift of agreement. Beyond that, he represents a valuable informational resource to all participants.

Some practices that chairmen have found

useful may be mentioned specifically. At the opening session, the chairman establishes the framework for the sessions to follow, explaining the aim of the conference series, how the meetings will be conducted, and what is expected of the participants. At each session, he introduces the general subject for the day, announces the special topics into which it is divided, and presents the discussion leaders in charge of these topics. He does well to observe a time schedule, adjusting it freely when discussion should be carried further on a particular topic. He strives to keep items of general interest foremost. When the discussion does not seem to be of profit to the group and the discussion leader fails to sense it, it is the chairman's job to turn the subject or suggest a different approach.

In all this, chairmen have found it advisable to observe a few other cautions. A chairman must keep himself in the background. He is wise to confine his remarks to brief statements meant to clarify the thinking of the group or the problem at hand, and to give concise illustrations of practical value. Too active a part by the chairman in the discussion is bound to discourage spontaneous contributions by participants. Also, a premature expression of the chairman's personal views, which the group might fail to challenge because of his prestige, could shut off the discussion or inhibit it unduly. On the other hand, the chairman is best placed to bring up important points which have escaped attention, though only when the group has failed to conclude the topic properly, or if the discussion has become obscure or run afiel.

Finally, the chairman sees to it that each session is adequately summarized and the main points underscored. The summaries which the discussion leaders give look to particular topics; therefore, the chairman should add perspective to the detailed discussion by relating such particular topics to the larger context of budget administration. The chairman also needs to provide opportunity for further questions and consideration of any points which were deferred or unduly cut down. Small though the matter seems to be at first glance, it is an important function of the chairman to give participants credit for good ideas and effective contributions. Such appre-

ciation is appropriate and also helps to boost participation and group morale.

The chairman's role is made easier by the presence of discussion leaders. It has proved practical to divide each session into several topics, usually three to five. For the whole series of sessions, responsibility for the various topics is shared by the same three discussion leaders. As indicated earlier, outlines are distributed in advance among the participants in order to organize the discussion. But the order of proceeding is not rigid, and participants, of course, often add points of special interest to them. One job of the discussion leader is to exercise his own judgment about the best course to take, within the range of topics to be covered.

In a way, each discussion leader operates as a subchairman for his assigned topics. It is his task to bring about effective and adequate discussion. This entails, for instance, keeping the participants from wandering off the subject; securing general participation and not allowing one member of the group to monopolize the discussion; and identifying not only the most productive approach to the topic, but also the key individuals to rely upon. He should also spot the silent members who must be drawn into the discussion.

From their experience in the conferences, the discussion leaders have found it advisable to avoid giving answers or making decisions for the group. At the same time, they have tried to sense the moment when interest in the topic has been saturated; then they summarize and move on. They have found it best to shun an air of expertness and to refrain from the expression of strong opinions of their own.

In preparing for a session, a discussion leader checks the outline to make sure that it serves his need. He finds that thinking ahead about problems or questions likely to emerge in the discussion gives him more assurance and poise in guiding the group. A tentative summary, prepared in advance, is useful, though it may have to be modified to fit the actual course of the discussion. Ability to assist another discussion leader on his topic during the meeting, by briefly citing facts or asking questions which focus the point, also helps to sustain the pace.

Because of the emphasis on group discus-

sion, guest speakers are used sparingly in the training program. They can, however, help to present special accomplishments of an agency; to describe solutions to problems which have general, rather than exceptional, application; and to give an account of significant experience in dealing with difficult technical problems. Each talk should be as brief as possible to allow for criticism and questioning from the participants.

Related Factors

THE benefits of the budgetary training program are not confined to participants and operating agencies. The program is also helpful to the Bureau of the Budget and other agencies with government-wide responsibilities. To these it suggests problems in need of further attention. The program thus is a source of constructive ideas about the improvement of established requirements and practices. Also, because examiners from the Bureau of the Budget and budget staff at different organizational levels within the agencies face each other around the table as participants in the same training program, they are likely to gain a better understanding of their respective roles.

All of these benefits, to be sure, are returns from efforts invested continuously. A training program based on the conference method never becomes self-administering. One recurring need is for adequate discussion leadership in each conference series. While the Bureau of the Budget has usually provided at least one of the three discussion leaders at each series, the others have been supplied from among those agency staff members who attended a previous conference series as participants. These agency leaders are seldom available to serve in more than one conference series. A grooming of agency leaders in leadership techniques applicable to the training program is therefore required. This is done by a written guide on the leader's role, by the example of the most experienced of the three leaders, and by giving the leaders selected readings on training conference leadership—all in addition to the subject-matter guidance provided in the topical outlines.¹ It helps if someone who is

¹ Some materials the reader will find generally useful are: Institute for Training in Municipal Administra-

qualified to observe group participation sits in at times to record and analyze the character and intensity of interaction between leaders and participants; his suggestions may add to the effectiveness of the leaders.

Another recurrent need is more self-evident. Training materials must not be allowed to become stale. Responsibility for including new developments in budget administration is an important element in the continuing success of the program.

The results of the program cannot be measured precisely, either statistically or in money. The main sources of evaluation are the agency budget officers, who send their staff members into the program, and the participants themselves. The budget officers have pressed for continuation of the interdepartmental conferences because of the benefit in staff performance which, in their judgment, has been attained. All but a very small fraction of the participants have expressed the same conclusion. Most of them have stated at the end of a series that they received useful ideas to apply or explore in their agencies. On the other hand, even a complete record of suggestions for improvement made by them and acted upon in their agencies would hardly demonstrate the whole value of the program in long-range terms.

It is not surprising that budget officers of some of the larger agencies have weighed the advantages of similar conferences in their own agencies. Three of the large departments—Agriculture, Commerce, and the Treasury—have each recently conducted an agency conference in budget formulation. The materials prepared for the interdepartmental series were used, and the same methods followed.

Agency conferences obviously extend the scope and progress of budgetary training in federal administration. The substance of the discussion can be related specifically to the agency's programs and problems. There is also

the possibility of adapting the agency conferences to somewhat different staff needs—for example, for junior budget staff; or for staff in specializations which support the budget function one way or another; or for line supervisors whose responsibilities call for an orientation in budgeting.

A fully developed and well tested training program can be transferred with little difficulty from the interdepartmental to the agency level. It does not follow, however, that agency conferences make unnecessary the interdepartmental conferences at the present time. In the first place, agencies able to conduct their own conferences recognize the advantage of sending some of their employees to the interdepartmental conferences as a means of training them to assist in administering agency conferences. Second, the budget staffs of many agencies are too small to make it feasible for them to organize a series of their own. And third, interdepartmental conferences are likely to have a greater number of high-level participants, besides the presence of staff from the Bureau of the Budget—factors that tend to strengthen the conference.

Conclusions

WHEN one considers the entire experience with the training program in federal budget administration, a number of conclusions can be drawn. Of these, some relate exclusively to the nature of the budget process, the degree to which it operates as an element of general management, and the extent to which specialists in budgeting view their function in narrow or broad terms. Conclusions applicable only to the particular subject of the training program are here of secondary interest, and therefore need not be mentioned. There remain, however, other conclusions of more general significance.

First, the evidence suggests that a strong training program in any of the management specializations, like budgeting, calls for an active role, at least at the beginning, of the central agency most closely associated with the specialization. Planning such a program is no small thing. Utilization of the resources of the central agency identified with the specialization gives reasonable assurance that adequate preparation will go into the program. A pro-

tion, *Conference Method Training in Management* (International City Managers' Association, 1946); "A Guide to Successful Conference Leadership" [digest of manual used in course at Esso Training Center, Standard Oil Company (N. J.)], 24 *Personnel* 328-40 (March, 1948), 25 *Personnel* 31-46 (July, 1948); George D. Halsey, *Training Employees* (Harper, 1949), pp. 51 ff.; Alfred M. Cooper, *How to Conduct Conferences*, 2d ed. (McGraw-Hill, 1946), pp. 136 ff.

gram lacking thorough preparation may do more harm than good.

Second, for success such a program depends in very large part on the acceptance it finds among its principal beneficiaries, that is, the line agencies. Although these are likely to be responsive because they expect benefits for their own operations, they have to bear the burden of releasing employees part-time for training purposes. To gain acceptance in the longer run, the program must be good. For acceptance in the beginning, which is often decisive, the program should be so organized as to draw into its planning and conduct the leading representatives of the particular specialization in important line agencies. Cooperative arrangements might well include a steering committee along interdepartmental lines.

Third, once the pattern of the program has been formed and the study materials are in fairly definite shape, the essential working knowledge about administering the program can be communicated without great effort. From this point on, the operating budget of the program, as far as the central agency is concerned, need not go beyond some part-time activity. That is a small price to pay. But continuing review by the central agency is the best guaranty against an inconspicuous deterioration of the program, even if the review does not attempt to go into much detail.

Fourth, for employees with a normal interest in their specialized work, it is much more productive and attractive to share in an exchange of ideas and experiences within a relatively small group than to be pinned down to a lecture course, or anything like it. Sustained interest and response appear to correlate with opportunity for individual participation; thus, a setting must be created in which free self-expression is the normal and expected reaction. However, the individuals should form a group which pulls together for a common purpose. The integration of the group is largely dependent upon the attitudes and conscious efforts of the chairman and discussion leaders.²

² For a report on a study of the process of group discussion and group work, see *The Journal of Social Is-*

Fifth, a training program built on group discussion puts large responsibility on those who function as the leaders. It is rarely possible to select them in terms of demonstrated capacity as training conference leaders. As a consequence, each of the leaders must be briefed on his role. Also, busy with other responsibilities as he is apt to be, the leader must take his assignment seriously. How each leader will actually perform is difficult to know in advance. His performance could be surprising either way. Yet the contribution of the leaders is probably the most important single factor in securing the full results of the program. As a rule leaders who can use suggestions do the best job.

And sixth, training in any specialized work may be expected to be practically useful in proportion to its broadening influence. Specialists need a feeling for adjacent fields of specialization. Thus, a broadly conceived training program in a particular subject may bring about incidentally that general orientation which frees the specialist from undue narrowness and makes him an alert member of the team.

The future of any training program such as this depends on a keen awareness, by those responsible for its administration, of the influences which affect the administrative environment. Reexamination of the record, the purposes, and the pattern of the program is essential from time to time. Too long has budgeting been looked upon as a technician's job. With the growing emphasis on program—or "performance"—budgeting, it is likely that budgeting will become more fully integrated with general administration, and hence of greater interest to operating officials as well as the entire body of specialists in the field of management.

sues, Vol. 4, no. 2 (Spring, 1948). The issue contains several articles under the general title of "The Dynamics of the Discussion Group," reporting findings from the experimentation carried on at the First National Training Laboratory in Group Development held at Bethel, Maine in the summer of 1947. The laboratory was developed jointly by the Research Center for Group Dynamics and the Division of Adult Education Services of the National Education Association.

Integration vs. Decentralization in the Federal Field Service

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IN RECENT years the federal government has undertaken the performance of many functions that relate directly to the welfare of individual citizens. As a result, there has been a growing awareness of the need for decentralizing responsibility and authority to the lowest possible echelons of field organizations in order to facilitate more expeditious completion of transactions with citizens, business groups, and state and municipal organizations. Efforts to accomplish such decentralization have frequently been associated with the trend toward the appointment of strong regional directors, district managers, and other "line" officers with responsibility for supervising integrated operations in the field.

It has been argued that the decentralization of operating authority and responsibility cannot be undertaken until the operations in each geographical area have been placed in charge of a "line" official who is competent to represent and act for the head of the agency within the area for which he is responsible. It is the purpose of this paper to show that the premises which indicate the need for such strong line officials are quite different from those which indicate the need for further decentralization of authority and responsibility, and that in many agencies the existence of strong line officers has actually impeded efforts further to decentralize operations.

Bureaus and divisions at the Washington level are ordinarily organized on the basis of responsibility for the accomplishment of specific objectives or the performance of specific functions essential to the agency's total objective. Although within each field office organization units may be established and operated on

the basis of functions or objectives, the location of the office, the size of the area it serves, and the number of persons employed are all determined primarily on the basis of geographical considerations. Regardless of the number or variety of functions performed by such an office, geography is the principal limiting factor in determining the responsibility of the head of such an office.

It is this difference in their basis of organization that determines in large part the nature of the Washington-field relationships. In a unifunctional field service the problem is greatly simplified because each field station manager is concerned only with the administration of a single function, the ultimate responsibility for which rests with the functional chief at the Washington level. Whenever an attempt is made to administer a number of diverse functions through a single series of field offices, the problem is greatly complicated because the manager of a field station under such an arrangement is ordinarily responsible to the head of the agency in Washington, or to a subordinate line official, for the effective coordination and integration of all the various functions carried on within the geographical area served by his office.

The problems of field administration are obviously more difficult when a single series of field offices is called upon to administer not a single program but a variety of programs and activities. It is with this type of situation that this paper is principally concerned.

Reasons for Integrating Field Functions

IT is conceivable that every Washington division or bureau having responsibility for a function or objective that requires the per-

formance of services in the field could establish its own field stations and employ the personnel necessary to perform these services without regard to the field facilities required by other divisions or bureaus of the same agency. As a matter of fact this is the way in which the field work of many agencies is carried on. In other agencies, however, it is regarded as desirable to integrate two or more field functions by administering them through a single field organization.

What are the reasons for bringing different functions together into a single series of field offices? Some of the more common reasons are discussed briefly below.

If the functions of two or more divisions in the field are such that they both deal with the same clientele, there is need for establishing in each principal field station an official with sufficient authority to ensure the coordination of the agency's total relationships with this clientele. Persons who have occasion to do business with the federal government generally know which over-all agencies have responsibility for the matters in which they are interested. They do not ordinarily know the internal organization structure of these agencies, and it is unreasonable to expect that they will be informed of or understand the changes which frequently occur. There exists, therefore, an obligation to organize field offices in such a way as to avoid, as far as possible, the need for referring clients to a succession of different offices or officials for related services.

The case for such organization is augmented by the opportunity it affords for an improved working relationship between the agency as a whole and the agricultural, commercial, or other groups in the area served who have an interest in the agency's operations.

The functions of two or more divisions in the field may be so interrelated that the effective operation of one depends on the output of one or more of the others at the same administrative level. In these circumstances, the appointment of a manager with authority to ensure the desired working relationships, including authority to schedule the work of the several divisions concerned, will make for the effective performance of all of the functions involved. The appointment of such a manager will facilitate the reconciliation of differences

between divisions at the local level as they arise, and will prevent, in many cases, the delays and possible misunderstandings that may result from referring such differences to Washington.

The possibility of achieving more economical field operations through the use of centralized staff for the performance of personnel, accounting, procurement, and related services is a forceful argument for the integration, in a single series of field offices, of functions which are carried on by the separate bureaus or divisions of an agency or department in Washington.

This is by no means an exhaustive list of the circumstances which may make it advisable to establish an integrated field service for a particular agency. It merely indicates the kind of factors which should be considered in reaching a decision.

There is no intrinsic virtue in the integration of field operations; it is an administrative device which should be used only when the circumstances of a specific situation warrant. Integration of field activities is justified only when it will aid in the more effective accomplishment of field programs. To force field activities into a close administrative relationship when no useful purpose is served thereby is to make integration an end instead of a means and is a perversion of sound organizational methods. Integration creates problems with which unfunctional field organizations do not have to deal; it should be undertaken only when the advantages to be gained outweigh the problems which will inevitably develop.

Integration may be applied in varying degrees to different aspects of a field organization. It may be desirable, for instance, to integrate at a designated level in a field service the performance of certain functions such as the preparation of payrolls or the procurement of supplies and equipment. Or it may be desirable to consolidate the legal or informational services of different divisions in the field. The consolidation of such activities need have no implications as to the desirability of integrating other field activities. A uniform degree of integration in any field organization makes it easy to prepare beautiful organization charts and simplifies the problems of ad-

ministrative analysts; it by no means ensures the most effective accomplishment of an agency's field programs. Persons who insist upon uniformity in the degree of integration of the field functions of any agency have mistaken the forms of administration for the substance and may easily do more harm than good.

Reasons for Decentralizing Functions to the Field

THE premises which should govern a decision as to whether or not a particular function should be decentralized are quite different.

The most important factor to be considered is the improvement of services to citizen-clients. The very considerable decentralization by the War Production Board of authority to grant priority ratings and the issuance of ration certificates by local OPA boards during World War II made the administration of such controls more acceptable to persons whose business affairs and lives generally were seriously disrupted by wartime measures. The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service has found that its field commissioners are much more effective in bringing about agreement between the parties to labor disputes if they are given a broad delegation of authority in the conduct of negotiations, for then they can "tailor" the services of the agency to the problems involved in each dispute.

A second, and scarcely less important, factor is the desirability of performing the service or function with the greatest economy of effort and expense. If it is necessary to deal with a citizen directly at the local level, as in the case of a customs inspection or the examination of applicants for airplane pilot certificates, the transaction should be completed so far as possible by the official who is involved in that direct relationship. Each referral of the problem upward in the administrative hierarchy adds to the work load of the agency concerned.

The decentralization of internal administrative services, such as the procurement of supplies and equipment and the authorization of official travel, is frequently desirable because it permits these matters to be adjusted more adequately to the operating needs of the service at each principal location. It also permits problems to be disposed of at the place where

they arise instead of adding to the work load of administrative personnel "up the line."

There are, of course, counter-considerations which must not be neglected. There is the need, for instance, for uniformity in the handling of similar situations throughout the country. The WPB was severely criticized at times because large companies with several branch offices found that similar priority applications were given ratings by some WPB field offices and were rejected by others.

Frequently, problems of a specialized nature do not arise in sufficient number at a local station to warrant the employment of a full-time specialist to deal with them. When these are forwarded to a regional office or to Washington, they provide a work load of sufficient volume to justify the employment of one or more persons with the necessary skill and training to give them the specialized attention to which they are entitled.

The appropriations of most agencies are not adequate to cover the cost of all the activities which agency officials consider necessary or desirable. The performance of routine field operations may be budgeted in advance, but the central agency must carefully weigh the relative merits of the proposals from field offices for the addition of new functions. The relationship of a limited budget to the broad decentralization of authority to act is obvious.

There will be, in individual agencies, special problems or situations which have an important bearing on the extent to which functions can or should be decentralized. The foregoing brief discussion of a few of the more common considerations should be sufficient to demonstrate, however, that the factors involved in a decision as to the decentralization of functions to the field are different from those involved in a decision as to the integration of functions at the field level.

Integration vs. Decentralization

SO LONG as the functions of Divisions A, B, and C in a hypothetical bureau are administered by three *separate* and *independent* series of field offices complete responsibility for the success of these functions throughout the United States rests with the respective division chiefs. The operations of Division A in Des

Moines, Iowa, will be performed in accordance with instructions from the chief of Division A in Washington and in all probability the operations in Des Moines will be supervised by a local manager who was selected by the chief of Division A. Under these circumstances the extent to which the functions of the division will be performed in Des Moines can be resolved on the merits of the case, and whatever the decision, the ultimate authority and responsibility for function A remains wholly with the chief of the division.

Now suppose that Divisions B and C have also been operating field offices in Des Moines and that, after considerable study, it is decided that the objectives of the bureau as a whole would be more effectively accomplished if the three functions in Des Moines were consolidated into one office to be operated under the supervision of a manager appointed by and responsible to the bureau director.

The working relationships of the several division chiefs with the field in Des Moines are fundamentally altered by this new arrangement. No longer is each division chief solely responsible for the success of the function assigned to him. He must, henceforth, share this responsibility with the new office manager in Des Moines and is confronted by the very real possibility that the resources of the Des Moines office, including the staff which formerly worked on his functions alone, may be diverted at times to other programs carried on in the same office. Moreover, the authority to select and assign employees for the performance of this function must now be shared (if it is not lost entirely) with a manager over whom he has no control and whose personal attitudes and interests may differ sharply from his own.

Is it any wonder that under these circumstances a Washington division chief may be reluctant to assign additional responsibility and authority to the Des Moines office? Each activity decentralized means a lessening of his own control over the function for which he still feels a unique and special responsibility to the bureau chief.

The attitude of a typical division chief toward the decentralization of responsibility to an integrated field station will probably not be expressed in such direct terms as this discussion might suggest. The reasons he will

give for avoiding such inroads on his authority will be much more indirect. He will be able to argue cogently that the need for uniformity in operations, or the highly technical skills required, make it necessary for each transaction to be completed in Washington. Or, he may "go along" with the decentralization program, but insist that all cases of certain types or involving sums in excess of certain amounts must be approved or "cleared" in Washington before consummation in the field.

In one agency for instance, nearly all purchase contracts are made in the field. A first impression is that the agency has gone all the way in the decentralization of this operation. A closer inspection, however, reveals a substantial number of circumstances in which Washington clearance must be obtained before purchases are made. In this situation the affixing of the final signature to the purchase document is of comparatively little significance.

The means by which decentralization is resisted are frequently very subtle, indeed. Often reasons are expressed in such technical terms that it is not possible for an outsider to refute them without an exhaustive study. Once the director of a bureau or agency has adopted a policy of decentralization to integrate field offices it would be most indiscreet for a division chief to oppose it openly, but technical justifications for exceptions to a decentralization policy have proved in many cases to be a most effective second line of defense.

There is, of course, a wide range of possibilities in the degree to which functions may be decentralized. Particular situations are also confused by the fact that the degree of decentralization in operation may differ considerably from the degree expressed in the official orders on the matter.

In some of the agencies with which the author is familiar integrated field operations seem to be well established, and the functional division chiefs in Washington appear to be almost completely reconciled to the fact that their relationship to field operations has become largely or entirely advisory. In another group of agencies, the integration of field activities is more or less nominal, and substan-

tial segments of the field work remain under the exclusive direction of the Washington division chiefs.

In one agency, which has the form of an integrated field service, the issue of "decentralization" is very vigorous at the present time throughout the organization. Only limited success has been achieved in the decentralization of operating functions; considerable progress has been made, however, in decentralizing authority for administrative functions. This case is an interesting example of the general thesis of this paper. The ostensible reason for the decentralization of administrative authority is to facilitate the performance of operating functions in the field. It is often presumed that the existence of adequate administrative authority at the field level should encourage the decentralization of operating functions. As a matter of fact, however, there is good reason to believe that the decentralization of authority to regional directors may in fact cause functional chiefs in Washington to be even more vigorous in their efforts to resist the decentralization of operating functions.

Achieving an Effective Balance

THERE is much to be said in favor of the integration of different field functions at each principal field station under the strong line direction of a local manager whose authority within the area supersedes that of any of the Washington division chiefs concerned. Although it is true that there must be a certain degree of uniformity and consistency in the administration of a particular function throughout the nation, it would seem even more important that the relationships between similar functions in any one location be sufficiently flexible that they can be adapted to the circumstances peculiar to that location. The achievement of this objective requires both integration and decentralization.

The case for integration, however, has sometimes been oversold. There are some agencies in which the several functions carried on in the field are of such different types, and affect such completely different groups of clients, that there is no need or justification for integration. Some of the resistance to integration stems from the fact that efforts have

sometimes been made to introduce integration where it serves no real purpose.

Decentralization, on the other hand, is more consistently to be desired. Functions which require direct dealings with individual clients should ordinarily be decentralized to the greatest extent possible. The efforts to achieve this goal should not be confused, however, with arguments for or against integration. They are separate problems and should be separately resolved. Integration may or may not be desirable in any particular set of circumstances. Decentralization is nearly always desirable when relationships with the public are involved. It may even be urged that under such circumstances the burden of proof should lie not with those who propose decentralization but rather with those who insist upon centralization. In appraising any given situation particular attention should be given to the possibility that the adoption of a policy of integration may actually impede effective decentralization.

In some cases a satisfactory degree of integration may be obtained by establishing, in each city where separate field offices are located, committees composed of the heads of these offices in order that each office may be kept informed of the activities of the others. A further degree of integration may be achieved by cooperative arrangements for the handling of administrative services. These and similar measures may be taken without seriously impairing the authority of the Washington division chiefs concerned, and with only minor changes in the degree of decentralization involved.

If, however, circumstances warrant the assignment of several field functions to a single series of integrated field offices and the decision is made to decentralize substantial operating responsibilities, the top administrator concerned will have a better chance for success in this difficult venture if he understands thoroughly the different premises upon which integration and decentralization are based and the conflicts that are likely to result. He is then in a better position to deal adequately and firmly with such conflicts.

Among the measures that he may take to implement such a policy is the assignment of responsibility for the "line" supervision of

field operations as a whole to a strong deputy or assistant administrator headquartered in the Washington office. The responsibilities of a typical bureau or agency chief are so complex that he is forced to rely in large measure upon the recommendations of his principal assistants. Ordinarily most of these assistants will be division or branch chiefs who have responsibility for specific segments of the total program. It may be expected that their recommendations will be strongly influenced by their special interests. Unless the administrator has on his immediate staff a deputy or an assistant who consistently represents to him the "case" for decentralized operations through integrated field offices his decisions will almost certainly reflect some functional bias. In the event of an issue between a Washington division chief and any particular field office manager, the Washington division chief is in a much better position to win the decision; he may even be able to hold his own against the combined judgment of all the field office managers as a result of close, daily working relationships with the administrator. The function of a deputy administration for field operations in these circumstances is obvious.

It is important, too, that the field office managers report to the deputy or assistant in charge of field operations so that he has a bona fide responsibility for the successful conduct of field activities. Unless he has such responsibility, his judgment and opinions can never carry a weight equal to that of the functional division chiefs with whom he is required to negotiate, and "functional thinking" will tend to prevail.

In a number of federal agencies in which field office managers report directly to the administrator it is stated that these managers have final authority for the work performed in their regions or districts. However, in the formulation of budget estimates, in the allocation of funds, and in the day-to-day decisions on program matters, the administrator is obliged to rely almost entirely on the recommendations of functional division chiefs, none of whom have responsibility for ensuring the balance and coordination which are essential to successful integration of field operations.

In one agency in which a deputy administrator for field operations acts only in a liaison capacity between regional directors and the Washington office, it appears that his functions are almost entirely limited to the reconciliation of individual Washington-field controversies, and that he is unable to act with sufficient authority to ensure coordination and a proper recognition of the responsibility delegated to regional directors so that these controversies will not develop.

It is possible, of course, and may be desirable in some cases, to establish a limited integration of field activities under a regional or local office manager who is responsible only for such coordination among local functional supervisors as may be achieved through their voluntary cooperation. Such a manager may serve a useful purpose in representing the agency as a whole to the local community. He may actually supervise a small administrative staff which provides limited administrative services to all the functional groups attached to the office. It is strongly suspected that this is the actual state of affairs in many field organizations where organizational charts and manuals indicate that the field managers have "line" authority. Although efforts to establish the bona fide authority of local managers in such cases should not be easily abandoned, it will be better, in the long run, to recognize failures and revise manuals and charts accordingly than to permit the continuation of fruitless and sometimes heated debates over issues which have already been won, for all practical purposes, by the functional division chiefs in Washington.

In conclusion, it may be pointed out that some 90 per cent of the employees of the federal government now work outside Washington. Many are engaged in activities that affect directly the welfare of citizens and their communities. A careful re-evaluation of the field structures of the agencies responsible for these activities, with an awareness of the premises involved in decisions as to decentralization and integration, should be fruitful in solving problems of day-to-day administration and providing more effective services to citizens.

Reviews of Books and Documents

Policy and Administration

By Arthur W. Macmahon, Columbia University

POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION, by PAUL H. APPLEBY. University of Alabama Press, 1949. Pp. 173. \$2.50.

I HAVE been looking forward to talking with you, Paul, about this last book of yours. I am of two minds about a few of the things you say or don't say. In general I think you are profoundly right. One of the very good things that Roscoe Martin did at Alabama was to bring you there for the lectures that became this book. I was glad to note that you handsomely offered the volume as "an effort to express appreciation of the distinguished program going forward at the University of Alabama under the direction of Professor Roscoe C. Martin." I can't help adding that you have been kinder to Syracuse than to the South in enticing Roscoe to the Maxwell School, though I gather that his old program continues in good hands. Certainly it was a splendid ending for his stay at Alabama to sponsor V. O. Key's book on politics and yours on administration—Forgive me! I see you begin to wince when I seem to be slipping into the old dichotomy you criticize so roundly. You think we political scientists have carved things up partly to make our jobs easier.

Students of government found the Constitutional separation of powers congenial to their own needs to define and to divide into parts for special study the whole of our governmental reality.

Paul, I was struck by that sentence and remember it just as you say it. By the way, there is every reason why the excellent Appleby sentences should remain engraved on your mind for a long time to come. So, as we go on, don't struggle to find new words. I, too, remember many of your phrases exactly and expect to repeat them through the years, at first with honorable acknowledgment—until I succumb,

as I probably shall, to the delusion that they are my own ideas. And I remember that in the preceding paragraph—just before you spoke of the "necessities of the methods of scholarship" which have led to such unrealistic compartmentalizing—you wrote that "the effort of theory has been in considerable part to justify, to make real, to enlarge and to enforce the Constitutional pattern." I suspect, Paul, that this sentence, which you then erase by what you go on to say, may be a clue to a difference between us that tempts me to cavil a bit about some features of your book. Maybe we'll work back to this point. Fortunately, if I mention things your book leaves undone, I am talking to the very man to do them. Basically, I agree with what you say about the political character of public administration. I am not mistaken, I hope, in believing that, in the face of claims about the universal aspects of administration, you regard this as a crucial feature that sets off all public administration as unique?

The great distinction between government and other organized undertakings is to be found in the wholly political character of government. The great distinction between public administration and other administration is likewise to be found in the political character of public administration.

Your whole book, of course, is a spirited development of this point. The central thought seems to be your striking theme of a sort of pervasive calculus—the "political scale," I think you call it—which you find even subtler in measuring unlike things than the price system in economics.

In the field of government, every kind and conception of value weighs on the political scale, and only political processes produce a reading.

We students of government have never

doubted that, Paul, but I confess that we have tended to find the answer in an area of fluent politics and of legislative action, including, of course, the essentially representative role of elected chief executives. You go much further.

Public administration must contribute to the weighing, and to do that means to function politically.

Before I begin to disagree with you on some shadings, I want to be sure that I have your main ideas clearly in view, for yours is a very challenging way of looking at administrative life. If I follow your thought rightly, the mechanism of universal political evaluation is largely a potential; it is the universal possibility that any item of action or proposed action may be "called up"—as I think you put it—for consideration at higher and still higher levels.

Any particular problem is capable of being pushed upward for resolution by political processes. It is less likely to be pushed upward, as a general thing, if it directly affects only a few citizens, although charges of injustice to even a single citizen on some occasions have become national issues. Except where modified by leadership, the height of the level at which attention is given to a problem is roughly a product of the dissatisfaction of citizens, multiplied by their number and strength, modified by their geographical-jurisdictional location and by their persistence and techniques of agitation.

I note that you slipped in the words "except as modified by leadership." On this point I am afraid that, like the rest of us, you allow some of your argument to leak out through the hole of an unexplained and tantalizing qualification. But no matter. Certainly, in following your main thought, the thing that especially impresses me is your robust belief that the very fact any action can be "called up" politically is precisely the reason why discretion may be devolved widely and far down in the administration. This view challenges a lot we have assumed about the need for insulation where discretion is conferred, whether it is the insulation of a merit system of personnel or a board form of organization. Am I attributing too much to you?

Policy-making may take place with reasonable public safety at many levels in the execu-

tive government because the order of any decision is always subject to political determination, and arrived at in a political environment.

And what determines the order? I notice, by the way, that you use the word "order" almost interchangeably with the phrase "level of decision." What fixes the level?

Subject to such calling up, normal administrative or legislative fixing of the order of a particular decision—the level at which it may be made—is done by a subtle process of political evaluation. That evaluation is reached generally through anticipation of popular reaction; as a response to experience, convention and precedent; under pressure from interests directly concerned; under pressures from other parts of the government; and in specific cases through popular debate, campaigns and elections.

The sweep you give in all this to the word "political" reminds me of your eight political processes and, incidentally, of your curious fondness for the numeral eight. As I recall it, you mention eight distinct political processes, eight factors which determine the degree of political involvement, and eight types of executive departments and agencies. I was falling under the hypnotic influence of one of the least mystical of numbers when the spell was broken by your announcement that there are nine factors which determine the nature and performance of an organization. With the trance thus broken, I could see that the purpose of your taxonomic exercise was to put the administrative or executive process in its place as the eighth political process. Let me see if I can recall the others: the presidential nominating process; the nominating process generally; the electoral process; the legislative process; the judicial process; the process of organizing and maintaining parties, exclusive of nominations; the agitational process.

Your list of eight political processes—including the administrative or executive process—is very suggestive. You take the easy course, to be sure, when you treat the legislative process as everything that bodies called legislatures do and the administrative or executive process as everything done by agencies other than legislatures and courts. This classification, I admit, may be as sensible as it is easy. In any case it suits your tendency to minimize the impor-

tance of steps or stages in the policy-making continuum that runs through all parts of the government. Here, again, is an item of possible criticism to which I shall return, for perhaps you are by-passing the very differentiations that call for analysis. As you will see, all of my few criticisms head into the same point. Begging such questions for the moment, I note with especial interest that you view the eighth political process—administration—as itself partly a representative and argumentative process. I hope I read you rightly for I found myself cheering you for this heresy, as some may see it, about the nature of the administrative process.

It is a popular process in which vast numbers of citizens participate, in which assemblages of citizens comprise power units contending with each other, in which various governmental organizations are themselves functional representatives of special interests of many citizens, and in which these organizations themselves contend mightily with each other in the course of working out a consensus that translates many special interests into some workable approximation of public interest. This process is as essential to the evolvement of governmental action as public debate, and closely akin to it.

It is very reassuring to me to hear a respectable authority say what you have just said. It seems to me not only a true description but also a sound prescription. The most important as well as delicate task in shaping what is called structure in public administration is a calculated arrangement of human minds in relation to each other and the need is to arrange these minds, with the sensitivities and experience they embody, so that their juxtapositions as well as their mergers enrich the decisions that are made and contribute to the acceptability of the decisions. Having struggled through this sentence of my own, Paul, I have fresh respect for the lucid way in which you deal with these matters. Perhaps you recall the word of comment I have in mind.

In the posing of issues, and in their resolution, executive agencies perform a certain representative function, additional to the functions of other representatives of citizen interests.

No, that is not exactly the phase of your

description that I have in mind. Don't you remember linking the matter to the problem of coordination?

Increasing interrelations of governmental programs, putting a new emphasis on coordination, have made executive officials take on in dramatic ways a function of representing citizens in their diverse interests, and reconciling those interests.

To me, Paul, it is refreshing to have this view so frankly avowed by the author of *Big Democracy*. For the lesson that was outstanding in your earlier book—to me at least—was the democratic utility of a disciplined hierarchy. But I see by your expression that you think I may be going too far in assuming that you have repudiated or even modified any of your earlier views.

In any case, the operations of a hierarchy are important in getting decisions made on a basis representative of diverse points of view.

I think one of your most important contributions in this new book—I cannot say that you have done more than open the door on the subject—is to show how administration swings politically without being necessarily partisan.

Everything having to do with the government and everything the government does is political, for politics is the art and science of government. But in terms of mass, only a small part of politics is partisan. In a sense all issues nominated for public attention are also nominated for party attention. But parties accept only those issues which seem capable of being formulated in ways useful to them in effecting the establishment of a majority consensus.

You are quite ingenious in working out diagrams in which, generalizing on the public life you knew first hand from 1933 until you went into the hybrid business of being a dean, you show how the center of gravity swings back and forth in movements from conservative to liberal orientations and vice versa and how the area of discretion open to administrators in shaping policy varies in width at different stages in these swings. A striking feature is the change in administrative behavior in response to political changes without a change of party control, at least in the Presidency. To an Appleby, the reflection of these

swings throughout the administration is a necessary element in responsible government. Indeed, I suppose you regard it as a test of efficiency.

Political efficiency is the final criterion of every aspect of government, and the ability of our government to shift position in accord with changes in social needs and sentiments has much more to do with our social efficiency than any engineering measurements of any administrative processes.

You are immensely suggestive, Paul, but you leave the mechanics for further study. I recall that you say, probably almost in these words, that no hard and fast line exists, and none should exist, between the top civil service and the political officer level, including officers with party responsibilities. You remark that the matter needs much study and exposition. You go on to make the point that far-reaching shifts are effected with relatively few replacements.

A few hundred persons usually may make all the difference, accompanied by changes in assignments of some thousands of other existing personnel.

But you do add some arresting comments on the extent of changes in the high ranks in recent years, involving a mobility greater than that in Congress, and at one point you mar the favorable picture for me by a passing reference to "panic" in the civil service. What chiefly stands out in your trenchant discussion, however, is the idea that a career service, far from being inert, picks up and extends the changing political impulses.

Effectuation of the shift from conservative to liberal position, or from liberal to conservative position, poses a great administrative responsibility for policy. It is a process less exposed to view but quite as important as the shifts in Congress and White House. If the social shift is substantial, the bureaucracy tends at first not to move so far or so fast as country, President or Congress. If political forces continue to operate in that way, the bureaucracy gradually picks up speed in the new direction until at some points it is politically checked.

Through all of these exciting ideas, Paul, I am glad that you retain your belief in formal structure as the means by which responsibility

is assured. Indeed, I was so impressed by your point of view that I deliberately memorized the wording where you said you were seeking "to recover something of the peculiar significance of formal organization as the systematic and responsible vehicle of administration." Let me add that I enjoyed your considerate crack at the "discovery" of non-hierarchical association and communication of personnel. I assume you intended the quotation marks on the word "discovery" to be gently satirical. Of course, as you say, you take informal organization for granted. What especially interested me were some of the uses that you attributed to it—for example, in preventing conspiracy. Do you recall what you claimed for informal organization in that connection?

Its principal significance externally in relationship to policy-making within the administrative process has to do with the fact that it raises impediments to conspiracy on the part of administrative personnel. This is true because many persons have to know about almost anything done within the government, and because government personnel talk with extraordinary freedom.

Paul, on all such matters your confident and affirmative acceptance of the going processes of public life makes you a tremendously wholesome influence among us. Frankly, however, your analysis seems incomplete. Among the things that are still missing is a discussion of what I may term the ethics of administrative loyalty, including a viable code of administrative public relations. I think I can roll this comment, with some other items I have already mentioned, into a single general criticism. But before I pass to that, I want to say that the thoughtful realism that pervades your book is illustrated in the way in which you deal with circumvention as a phase of informal organization. Perhaps you can help me again in recalling your compact phrasing.

It is circumvention that makes the transaction of business possible, it is the chart that makes the transaction of business responsible. It is the right of access—rather than invariable handling—that supports responsibility, and it is the exercise of individual judgment concerning the need of hierarchal associates having the right of access on which the whole business turns.

Alas, Paul, when it comes to telling how one cultivates judgment in this regard you say one learns by burning one's fingers. Such being the case, your book fortifies me in believing that the most important thing to teach in advance, although not the only thing, is the complexion and purposes of the society and the nature of its political processes. Your own confidence in politics and your praise of politicians should steady us. You remind us who talk of administrative generalists that "the politician is the preëminent, practicing governmental generalist." That sentence, you see, I memorized and shall often repeat. Of course, with your emphasis upon policy-making in administration, you assume that much comprehensive program-building will be initiated by men called administrators.

Top-level administrators are generalists, too. The best ones in government service closely approach the politicians in ability to weigh forces, sentiments and demands. They somehow especially "understand the country," or large parts of it; such understanding, indeed, is the crucial essential to superior public administration.

Paul, I fully accept the far-reaching implications of what you say, including the implications for training. Here, however, I come to my single main point of criticism—if mentioning an incomplete agenda may be called criticism. Is not one of the main features of political sensitivity a sharpened awareness of differ-

entiations which in our political life we have deliberately recognized and sought to establish? Isn't your portrayal of what you call the continuum of policy-making a little too continuous?

Confusion enters when the continuum is denied. Wisdom comes when the process of decision-making is considered as a whole.

Paul, you certainly stand your ground and I dare say that all I am contending for is present by implication in your book. Nowadays, of course, many are beginning to insist that decision-making be looked at more closely and also viewed as a whole. Perhaps no one brings to it such a background of experience and rumination as you. I can't help adding my fear that, taken out of your own thoughtful context, stress on the continuum just as a continuum may actually do harm. Playing with the same word you use, I have referred in these pages to a differentiated continuum. No doubt it has been useful, and is still useful, to correct our perspectives by insisting on the fact of the continuum. For the future, it will be the demarcations that will be the important and difficult things to clarify and perfect in that unending but cumulative experience in reasoned social relations which, with no pedantry or limiting legalism, is nobly called constitutional government. Your book is no mere preface; it stands by itself; but it is likewise a summons, even in its silences. We are greatly in your debt.

The Blending of Area and Function

By Alfred C. Wolf, U. S. Department of the Interior

AREA AND ADMINISTRATION, by JAMES W. FESLER. University of Alabama Press, 1949. Pp. 158. \$2.50.

I

THE theme of Dr. Fesler's volume, which consists substantially of lectures delivered at the University of Alabama in 1947, is the reciprocal adjustment of function and area. To thoughtful administrators in all levels of government this can only mean: how find the medium through which can be reconciled the many jobs which government must perform

and the many areas in which these jobs are to be accomplished?

To those familiar with the literature of areal administration this book provides little that is new. Many of its concepts are generally familiar to those who have read the author's earlier contributions; the footnotes refer to the contributions of others on whom he has drawn. To the student and practitioner alike, however, Dr. Fesler has performed a great service in the manner in which he has defined area, both as a concept of socio-economic, cultural,

and geographic place and as categories of administrative phenomena. He has also given a most useful analysis of the relationship between the former which he designates as natural areas, and the latter which he describes as administrative areas.

The author finds that administrative areas fall into two types: "... governmental areas, in each of which a general or special unit of government collects funds and administers several functions or a single function; and field service areas, each of which is only a portion of the total area within which a department or bureau of a general government administers its functions." General governmental areas serve the governments of the nation, the states, and local areas. By special unit of government the author means a limited purpose governmental area such as a school district or housing authority. In this setting, the problem of relating function to area is all pervasive, involving age-old considerations of vertical and horizontal distribution of authority and the centrifugal and centripetal forces which beset those who would attempt to realign governmental responsibilities. Dr. Fesler concludes that, although the reciprocal relationship of area and function can be reconciled by a combination of structural reform and perfection of cooperative techniques, the adjustment will be slow, continuous—and uneven.

The worthwhileness of Dr. Fesler's contribution is increased by his insistence that we view the role of government through the eyes of the individual citizen in order to determine whether arrangements of governmental activities make sense; and, further, that any arrangement must be considered principally with an eye to increasing the sensitivity and response of government to what the author calls the need for customer satisfaction, but which we may describe broadly as the public interest. The persistent requirement imposed on administration to provide the flexible instrument for carrying out the purposes of democratic government, and even serve as the antennae for sensing new needs, is refreshing.

II

OF PERHAPS the greatest importance to the greatest number of us is Dr. Fesler's consideration of the problem of areal administra-

tion of the affairs of the federal government. It is not unnatural for this reviewer to have followed rather closely the illustrative material provided by Dr. Fesler in his description of the experiences of resource development agencies of the federal government as a part of the evolving pattern of reconciliation of function and area within the central government. Of particular interest, again perhaps a biased interest, is the example of the Department of the Interior. This example will consume a considerable portion of the remainder of this review.

As Dr. Fesler indicates, "resource development is the core of the most dramatic and challenging assertion of the primacy of area over function." This truth, however, is only partially reflected in the organization of the federal sphere. The criteria recommended by Dr. Fesler for evaluating the relationship of governmental function and area are the adjustment of governmental area to the natural distribution of the phenomena with which government must deal, administrative efficiency, adequacy of fiscal resources, and popular control. These criteria, when applied to governmental interest in natural resources, would certainly result in the allocation to the federal level of a principal concern, for example, in water resource development, forest and land management, and research and development of mineral resources. In view of the interdependence of natural resources, and their relationship to the national well-being, the federal interest is beyond dispute.

The manner in which this federal interest is expressed is of immediate concern to all of us. The reports of the task forces on natural resources and on agriculture of the Hoover Commission are recommended for a full description of the proliferation of this federal responsibility, ranging from the thoroughgoing areal approach of the TVA to the predominantly functional approach of other major departments. In no other field of federal responsibility is the expenditure of federal funds so completely areal. In no other field of federal responsibility is the need for reconciliation of area and function so great.

To avoid repeating much of what Dr. Fesler says in his book, it is desirable to move promptly into the example of the Department of the Interior. The history of the department

is generally known. For years it served as a catchall department, bringing together a variety of activities previously lodged in various agencies. Almost from the beginning the miscellaneous agencies of the department were overshadowed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, an agency with substantial responsibility for resource management, and the General Land Office, the original custodian of the public domain.

As the responsibilities of the federal government for conservation and development of the nation's resources expanded there were established in the department successively, as though in response to these growing federal responsibilities, the Geological Survey, the Bureau of Reclamation, the Bureau of Mines, the National Park Service, and the Grazing Service, which was later consolidated with the General Land Office into the Bureau of Land Management. The national forest reservations, authorized by Congress in 1891, were set aside from the public domain, and their administration was first assigned to the General Land Office. Although the national forests were transferred to the Department of Agriculture in 1905, the Department of the Interior has continued to have extensive interests in public and Indian forest lands. The Biological Survey and the Bureau of Fisheries, both concerned with management of natural resources, were transferred to the Department of the Interior from the Departments of Agriculture and Commerce, respectively, in 1939, and combined to form the Fish and Wildlife Service in 1940. On the other hand, activities of the department which were unrelated to natural resources gradually have been transferred to other agencies.

Thus, in response to changing conditions, the Department of the Interior has become by degrees an agency concerned with major programs for the conservation and development of our natural resources. It would be inaccurate to say, however, that the evolution of this unifying purpose has resulted in a unified department, with a central core of program in Washington, reflected in a fully developed areal organization. Externally, the department shares its responsibilities with a multiplicity of federal agencies. Internally, it consists of functionally organized bureaus, each of which

is confronted with problems of vertical distribution of authority and horizontal relationships with its Interior colleagues. The department as a whole is similarly confronted with the problem of decentralized administration and horizontal relationships with fellow agencies on all levels of government.

III

IN HIS chapter on "Emerging Areal Patterns of Intergovernmental and Interagency Cooperation," Dr. Fesler reviews accurately the experience of the Department of the Interior in attempting to meet this problem by exploring the possibilities of unifying field service areas and headquarters cities, decentralizing authority, and providing department-wide area coordination. He says properly that the objectives of this exploration were "... to improve program planning, increase administrative economy, and provide better service to the public." Dr. Fesler could not have selected a better example of the problem of adjustment of archaic federal structure to present-day needs. In 1946, the period which Dr. Fesler describes as the beginning of the period of experimentation, the department was in large part the product of fortuitous development—an experience shared with many other major agencies of the federal government. Its bureaus, proud of their technical competence, were also proud of their independent status. The unifying purpose, described above, is perhaps an overstatement when one attempts to measure its impact as of that time on the management of the affairs of the department. It cannot be said that today, three years later, the department is structurally different.

These three years are characterized, however, by some significant modification of management philosophy, which Dr. Fesler has noted. In the spring of 1946, the present Secretary, J. A. Krug, assumed office. Secretary Krug is perhaps the first career public administrator to head the department. He brought to the department pertinent experience acquired in state government, regional resource administration, and federal program administration. He possessed, in addition, an instinct for sound innovation. The temporary field committees, the permanent Pacific Northwest Coordination Committee, the Missouri

River Basin Field Committee, and "coordination" committees on the departmental level were the early products of this search for the key to adjustment. In addition, steps were taken to maximize delegation of authority to field representatives of individual bureaus, with accompanying realignment of field region boundaries and headquarters cities where this was possible under existing legal and financial conditions.

There is no purpose in reviewing the detailed course of this development; rather, the significant factors in its current status which have occurred since the preparation of Dr. Fesler's book will be described.

First of all, there has been significant recognition of the proposition, ably presented by Dr. Fesler, that meaningful areal adjustment cannot be accomplished unless there exists at the center reasonably effective machinery for assuring that the purposes of the department (meaning in this sense the totality of its organizational components) are clearly and unequivocally enunciated in terms that can be understood through all levels of the organization. This recognition resulted in the establishment in the winter of 1947-48 of a program staff, reporting to the Secretary and the Under Secretary, as an integral component of the Secretary's office. The staff's principal responsibilities are stated in the Secretary's order:

... The Program Staff, in order to enable the Secretary more effectively to discharge his responsibility for formulating, recommending and executing policies and programs within the jurisdiction of the Department, is authorized to examine all policies and programs of the Department with the objective of ascertaining that (a) they are integrated and internally consistent; (b) they constitute a full utilization of the Department's powers for carrying out the responsibilities of the Department; (c) they are appropriately related to the programs and policies of other agencies of government; and (d) they are in proper context with the current and prospective needs of the national economy. Based upon the results of its examinations under this section the Staff will make such recommendations to the Secretary as will assist him in the performance of his responsibility.

For the first time in the history of the department there exists on the departmental level a

group whose sole purpose is to translate vague purpose into specific program—program which will consist of precisely stated objectives, related in a meaningful way to accepted national economic goals and to recognized responsibilities of other federal agencies for portions of these goals. This is less a matter of coordination than it is of formulating a common path from a welter of related activities prescribed by statute.

The next step was to capitalize on the excellent beginning which had been made through the earlier field coordination committees to provide the nucleus of an organization which would reflect in the field the concept of "informed" purpose which was being generated at home. This step was taken by the Secretary in August, 1948 when he established permanent field committees in place of the admixture of permanent and temporary committees which existed at that time. The significance of this step can be related more clearly by summarizing the pertinent provisions of the Secretary's order establishing the committees:

1. Field committee regions are established in Alaska, Pacific Northwest, California, Colorado River-Great Basin, Missouri River Basin, Southwest, and Eastern United States (temporary).

2. The purpose of the field committees is to improve the facilities for assuring that the department's programs in these regions are (a) integrated and internally consistent, (b) appropriately related to the programs of other federal, state, and local agencies of government in these regions, and (c) in proper context with current and prospective needs of the regional and national economies.

3. Each field committee is to consist of (a) a full-time chairman, selected by and representing the Secretary, (b) a member from each agency of the department engaged in field operations in the region, and (c) a full-time committee staff. Each agency member is to be the ranking field official of his agency in the region and is to possess as much authority as is required to participate in carrying out the committee's responsibilities.

4. Based on continuous observation of the requirements of its region, and the relationship of the department's responsibilities to these requirements, each committee is to prepare a department-wide, long-range program adequate to meet the region's needs. This program is to be stated in terms of proposed activities, is to be revised annually, and is to estimate yearly costs at least six years in advance. Through this device, the com-

mittee is to participate in annual appropriation estimates and allocation of funds, so as to assist in achieving a balanced departmental program for the region. In addition each committee is to serve, through its chairman, as a focal point for the department in dealing with public and private agencies in the region on matters related to the department's interest; further, each committee is to submit recommendations for effecting improvements and economies in administration.

5. Program reports and other recommendations of the committees are to be transmitted by the chairmen to the Secretary through the chairman of the program committee in the Office of the Secretary (described below).

These are the principal substantive provisions of the order. There are also provisions concerning frequency of meetings and finances and to assure that committees do not interfere with relationships between bureau superiors in Washington and subordinates in the field.

The field committees are to do in microcosm in the field what the program staff is to accomplish on the departmental level. Each is to sense the nature of the contribution required of the *Department* in the field area for which it is responsible, and to produce a program which will reflect in precise terms this departmental contribution. Regional boundaries for field committees are in most cases based on river basins as the most reasonable approximation of a geographic area which serves the purpose for which the committees are established—program development, with secondary emphasis on "coordination." Of particular significance is the designation of the chairmen of the field committees as representatives of the Secretary. This is a step beyond the situation described by Dr. Fesler, in which a committee member (a bureau representative) was elected annually to serve as chairman, assisted by a committee staff. This development means the designation of a full-time professional person to provide continuity in guiding the committee's activities, assisted in turn by a small full-time committee staff. The planning orientation of the chairman, staff, and committee is highlighted by the specific prohibition against administrative responsibility for any bureau activity within a region.

The third development in the department's movement toward reconciling area and func-

tion is the establishment in the Office of the Secretary of a program committee. This committee, consisting of the chiefs of the bureaus of the department and the principal staff officers of the Secretary, is chaired by the director of the program staff. The main objectives of the committee are to provide a formal means of giving the director of the program staff the information and advice he requires in the discharge of his responsibilities and to facilitate relationships between the field committees and the department.

The field committees submit their policy and program recommendations to the chairman of the program committee for consideration by the committee prior to being sent to the Secretary. Conversely, recommendations and instructions to the field committees on matters falling within their jurisdiction are forwarded to the field committees by the chairman of the program committee after consultation with the program committee. The order creating the program committee states that it "... shall not be construed to abrogate or diminish in any way the established authority or responsibility of the bureaus and offices of the Department, nor to interfere in any manner with their usual and specifically defined relationships to Secretarial officers."

The developments since 1946 can be summarized generally in this manner. There has been institutionalized within the departmental structure a concept of unified program. The first step was the development of the program staff in the Office of the Secretary. This was followed by the designation of departmental regions, the criterion for the boundaries of which was the river basin as the geographic area most conducive to balanced resource development planning. At the same time permanent field committees were established within these regions under full-time leadership, with full-time staff, directed to devote their attention primarily to program development. Then the program committee was established in the Office of the Secretary as the medium through which the work of the program staff and the field committees could be welded into programs and policies adequate for presentation to the Secretary.

IV

THE structure which has been described represents no modification in the basic architecture of the department; it has, in effect, been superimposed on the departmental structure. Bureau-departmental relationships and responsibilities are unchanged; the relationships between the bureaus at home and in the field are unchanged. Delegations of authority from bureaus in Washington to representatives in the field are moving along unevenly; the establishment of departmental regions was not accompanied by an immediate shift of bureau regional boundaries (where they existed) to coincide with the field committee regions.

As Dr. Fesler points out, there are two ways of reconciling function and area. One is by reform of the basic structure; the other is by application of cooperative techniques. In the case of the Department of the Interior, it would seem to be recognized that before a decision can be made that one or the other approach, or a combination, is the absolute answer, the way must be prepared by determining the objectives for which the department exists. This means finding a least common denominator—or perhaps several least common denominators—which will have the effect of joining together in clearly stated missions previously separated components of the department. With limited facilities available, this would appear to require a deliberate choice of paths. In this case, the Secretary apparently favored the "program" path—clearly enunciated objectives consisting of jobs to be done—clearly described steps by which these jobs will be accomplished. The path which would have encouraged the development within the departmental regions of centralized administrative services, and similar accouterments of improved administrative management, was relegated to a secondary place.

This appears to be a reasonable selection. Concentration on the purposes for which hundreds of millions of dollars are spent annually, rather than on the techniques of spending, would seem to be a wise allocation of resources. Similarly, the decision to accept the basic structure of the department, and to proceed cautiously therefrom, would appear to be a wise choice. The product is neither wholly a cooperative technique nor entirely a reform of struc-

ture. It is something of both. Offhand it appears to be the institutionalizing of a new piece of structure—a sort of pituitary gland which reflects the administrator's will that "purpose" shall permeate the activities of the *corpus* and that cooperative techniques among agencies are essential to getting along with management and with each other.

These developments are certainly not radical when viewed against the obvious anachronism of departmental structure and present-day needs. Yet, although each move was aired and discussed thoroughly within the department, each required a secretarial decision which involved a denial of the objections of one or more of the bureaus. Dr. Fesler has described very well, indeed, the centripetal and centrifugal forces which steps in any direction are likely to disclose.

The recommendations of the Hoover Commission concerning the management of the executive branch, coupled with the recommendations of the task force on natural resources would, if applied to the Department of the Interior, provide both the management flexibility and structural modifications which would expedite the adjustment of function to area. It is doubtful, however, whether such abrupt modifications would be as successful were they not preceded by the process of program orientation which is now being undertaken.

V

ALTHOUGH it is much too early to attempt to measure specific benefits of the Interior undertaking, some review might be enlightening. Continental United States and Alaska are divided into seven field committee regions. Permanent committees have been established in Alaska, the Pacific Northwest, the Missouri River Basin, and the Southwest. A chairman has been designated for the Colorado River-Great Basin region; the Pacific Central region will no doubt be activated in the near future. The Eastern region will have a temporary committee until recommendations are forthcoming from the program committee on a rational delineation of areal arrangements for the department's responsibilities in the East.

Several advantages may be noted in the four regions in which committees are functioning. First, there is a departmental spokesman, an

official of standing, who can represent departmental interests in relationships with the public and with public and private agencies. Second, the benefits of intra-agency communication are apparent; ranking officials of the agencies of the department now know each other and are accustomed to working with each other. This alone would justify the expense of the field committees.

Most important, however, each committee has in preparation for its region a resource development program. Each program is based on the committee's evaluation of the region's economic potential and the extent to which the Department of the Interior can contribute in exploiting this potential. It is couched in objectives of kilowatts of hydroelectric power acres of irrigable land, timber resources, conservation objectives on the public domain, fishery and wildlife resources, Indian resources, mineral prospects, amount of topographic and geologic mapping required. Regional programs are prepared not as separate plans of individual bureaus, but as bureau contributions to a total department program, internally consistent and geared to meet the needs of each region. Instructions on the preparation of programs provide that they are to show the job to be done year by year for six years, apportioned to each bureau, and expressed in fiscal terms. Estimates of cost are to be based on the program, not on historic trends in appropriations or considerations of political realities. This is, perhaps, an unreasonable limitation, but there is some indication that the instruction has been followed. The fact that these programs are a group product is of great value. The staff and chairman of each committee have served as cohesive influences; the process of turning out the job has in itself been of great value in developing corrective influences in the preparation of individual agency budgets. In two instances committees have recommended the establishment of regional budgets for their respective regions. Much remains to be accomplished, however, in terms of critical evaluation of the relationship between individual committee program statements and the regional economy, and between the needs of the several regions.

The preparation of program statements has resulted in lively discussion between those who

conceive their job to be of national significance, not to be prostituted to what Dr. Fesler describes as "area particularism," and those who observe that the undertakings of the department are accomplished *in situ*, and, consequently, should be so emphasized as to contribute to the maximum possible extent to the regions in which the jobs are performed. It can be said that the middle way is being approached. Bureaus which once were adamant in their refusal to decentralize on a regional basis are now arranging to do so, in part so that they can be more adequately represented on the field committees. Particularistic bureaus are occasionally taking a cosmic point of view on major issues. The development has been healthy.

The departmental program committee has met on an average of once a month for the past year. It has considered several of the regional programs; two more are to be reviewed shortly. Here is the opportunity for fitting areal particularisms, so far as field service areas are concerned, into the whole of national programs and policies. So far, the experience has been beneficial. Questions of inter-regional balance have been raised. For example, the program statement of one field committee, if subscribed to by the department, would absorb half the annual appropriation of the department. The answer is not to describe the program statement as unrealistic, but, rather, to consider the devices whereby the economic feasibility of each of the department's regional programs can be ascertained, arrive at a method which will permit a determination of relative emphasis for each program—relate the entire program to national economic situations—and then present the program to the Bureau of the Budget and the Congress.

The program committee has not been concerned solely with regional programs. Meetings have been held with representatives of the fiscal division of the Bureau of the Budget and of the staff of the Council of Economic Advisers in order to probe the relationships between the work of the department and the national economic program. The committee discussed the recommendations of the Hoover Commission concerning the department, and working subcommittees prepared portions of

the department's report to the Bureau of the Budget on these recommendations.

The program staff, meantime, has been serving as staff to both the field committees and the program committee. In addition, on its own, it has been engaged in such matters as a study of energy requirements over the foreseeable future, related to estimates of national economic growth. The product of studies such as this will be made available to the program committee, and it is hoped that by utilizing working groups of the committee the initial staff project will serve as a guidepost to the formulation of specific energy policy recommendations and programs which will influence the work of the individual bureaus within the framework of commonly accepted goals.

This completes the description of the efforts of this department to bring together the job to be done and the area in which it is to be performed. It is not the perfect experiment. Many facets of the problem have been overlooked; concentration on other facets has been almost instinctive. On the other hand, the climate has not been exceedingly favorable to successful innovation. This department is one of many which participate in resource development. The steps which it can take to bring about more rational conduct of its business are limited by its environment. The department is taking the step which appears to be most conducive to the efficient conduct of those matters with which it is charged—attempting, through institutional devices, to reorient the philosophy of those who carry on the department's work. This reorientation involves acceptance of a concept of a departmental purpose which will be consciously and continuously adjusted to the larger goals for which the federal government is responsible, a recognition that the work of the department is accomplished "in place" and that a reciprocal relationship exists between this work in place and these "larger goals."

VI

IT is obvious to the participants in this field that the federal environment requires modification. Amelioration of the statutory and organizational dispersion of federal responsibilities for resource development would go

far toward a rational reconciliation of function and area so far as federal responsibility for resource development is concerned. Dr. Fesler describes, in addition to the work of the Department of the Interior, the valley authority and the interagency river basin committee as alternative devices for accomplishing the areal job for which the federal government is responsible.

The valley authority is, of course, the most complete structural modification which can be devised for getting done the resource development job in a particular region. The Secretary of the Interior recognized this when, after evaluating the national import of the job to be done in the Columbia Basin, he endorsed the Columbia Valley Administration. By this act he demonstrated a most unbureaucratic quality in volunteering to divest himself of pieces of his own jurisdiction for a greater good. The voluntary associations, the interagency river basin committees, demonstrate the other pole—cooperative techniques without continuity of leadership and without staff. Unfortunately, few are in a position to say that either course provides the solution to be followed in a uniform manner. Many feel, including this reviewer, that the natural resources task force has pointed out the direction in which the most lasting improvement will be found. This direction would result in complete realignment of federal responsibilities, accompanied by a strengthening of the facilities of the Executive Office of the President for program direction and cohesion. At the same time reformed agency responsibilities would be decentralized to regions established to follow river basin boundaries, with accompanying arrangements for extending executive office cohesive influences among agencies so decentralized.

Meantime, it is unavoidable that federal resource development will be characterized by frequent cacophony. Although the current efforts of the Department of the Interior will better prepare the department for its role in the more harmonious federal symphony which is hoped for, the most immediate benefit is to synchronize, perhaps, the tunes coming from its own instruments.

The Port of New York Authority

By Edgar B. Young

A STUDY OF THE PORT OF NEW YORK AUTHORITY; ITS PURPOSE—ITS ACCOMPLISHMENTS—ITS PLANS FOR THE FUTURE, by FREDERICK L. BIRD. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 1949. Pp. 191. \$5.00.

AT THE outset I must admit a bias strongly favorable to the Port of New York Authority, its concept, its administration, and its program. I view it not only as a citizen of the Port District (hardly an old resident, to be sure), but also from the somewhat unusual vantage point of one who worked for a time in intimate contact with its administrative officers and who left the Port Authority with the keenest feelings of admiration and respect. It is perhaps because of this contact and in spite of this bias that I was asked to prepare a commentary upon Mr. Frederick Bird's book—the most recent general survey of this most unusual governmental agency.

Mr. Bird very appropriately summarizes the thinking which characterized the creation of the Port Authority in 1921 by compact between the states of New York and New Jersey:

The only concept, as the makers of the Compact saw clearly, which could secure for the Port District the full economic benefits of its geographic location and physical advantages was that of the region as an economic unit. (p. 188)

In keeping with this concept, the avowed purpose of the compact was to help produce "a better co-ordination of the terminal, transportation and other facilities of commerce" in the New York-New Jersey metropolitan area. Established as an independent agency, the Authority was empowered

"to purchase, construct, lease and/or operate any terminal or transportation facility" within the Port District . . . and . . . to make charges for the use of such facilities, to acquire real estate, and to borrow money. . . . (pp. 9-10)

But, significantly, it was not given the power to levy taxes. Thus it came to operate, within its realm, in many respects as any other governmental agency, but with the important dif-

ference that it could not feed at the public trough.

In early 1948 the Port Authority found itself midstream in a program of expansion which, both from its magnitude and the variety of projects, might have seemed staggering to any agency. The two states and the communities of the Port District had come increasingly to recognize the Authority as an instrumentality which could undertake the development and operation of major transportation projects without a drain on the taxpayers.

In addition to its six interstate bridges and tunnels, the Authority was already operating a marine grain terminal and an inland railroad freight station. Construction was under way on the huge truck freight terminals in Newark and Manhattan and on the Union Bus Terminal. Commitments had been made with New York City for the development and operation of LaGuardia and Idlewild Airports, and with the city of Newark for its air and sea ports. The Authority had, at the request of the municipalities, made definite proposals, which, if accepted, would mean enormous developments on the New York City and Hoboken waterfronts.

Financially the expansion program meant the necessity for floating bond issues to total over \$206,000,000, in addition to the \$215,000,000 of bonds outstanding. If the pier rehabilitation programs in New York and Hoboken should be adopted there would be an additional capital requirement of \$131,000,000.

Confronted with this situation, and in keeping with its tradition of seeking outside expert counsel on all of its developments, the Authority turned to the municipal division of Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. for an independent study and appraisal of its work and of its post-war program. The resulting volume by Mr. Bird is a highly informative, readable, and stimulating analysis, not only of the Authority's financial history and condition, but more generally of its function and administration.

It presents, pictorially as well as in text, the wide sweep of these unusual new developments. Of particular current interest is the section dealing with the airports and the use of nonoperating revenue sources in their financing.

The study should go far toward answering those many inquiries which the Authority receives, since (as expressed by Chairman Howard S. Cullman in his Foreword) it is "the prototype of public authorities in the United States, is dealing with problems of regional government which are likewise the concern of planners and administrators in other metropolitan areas, and has developed special technical and financial procedures."

Marshaling, as it does, such a mass of convincing data bearing on the soundness of the Authority's financial program, the study can hardly fail, also, to be of unusual interest to the potential investors in the Port Authority's tax exempt securities. Mr. Bird lays stress on the financial aspects of the Authority's history and plans because of his conviction that financial capacity and credit were basic prerequisites to progress and accomplishment. He points out the need for some equivalent of risk capital in financing marginal enterprises with revenue bonds. That equivalent is found in the established earning power of the Authority's existing facilities, together with ingenious plans of group rather than individual security, and a pooling of surplus revenues in a general reserve fund.

The Authority does not intend that earnings on one facility should pay for another. It has been scrupulously careful in its estimates of operating revenue to insure that each project gives adequate promise of becoming self-supporting. But there is a time lag in the realization of the full revenue potential on any new project. Mr. Bird describes the manner in which the general reserve fund meets this problem in the following paragraph:

The General Reserve Fund is not only a valuable stabilizing device but a constantly replenishable reservoir of risk capital which can be pledged to the support of bonds issued for new facilities which may be slow to reach a self-sustaining status. . . . The availability of the fund provides the means, otherwise lacking, for securing a market for new

bonds to finance marginal enterprises, and the resources of the fund may be drawn on to help carry new facilities while they develop earning power. But it would be only through a wide margin of error in the Authority's careful estimates that the undertakings now in progress would, over the long run, fail to make up early deficiencies and pay their own way. (pp. 184-85)

Mr. Bird concludes that "the large and relatively stable earning power of the agency's well-established facilities provides the foundation for safe expansion into new and more or less uncharted channels of activity; but only because of the ingenious devices which have been evolved for the pooling of revenues and conserving of surplus, the skill which has been developed in the administration of debt, and the public-spirited and nonpolitical character of the administration." (p. 184)

Many factors have contributed to this success and to the unusual and deserved reputation of the Port Authority; three of them seem to deserve emphasis here.

1. *The Tradition of Public Responsibility.* Seldom will there be found a group of lay and professional people more deeply concerned over their responsibility to the public than are the commissioners and the key staff members of the Port Authority. There is indeed a tradition of responsibility that pervades the thinking and actions of the individuals who comprise this body. This tradition is so strong that any newcomer to the group, either lay member and unsalaried commissioner or professional staff worker, is immediately and continuously impressed by the attitude of responsibility for a public trust which motivates the actions of his associates. The effect of this tradition, even upon a person who may not have entered the organization with any such convictions and motivation, is immediate and compelling.

The structure and autonomy of the commission are basic elements in the existence of this tradition. As Mr. Bird points out, the provision for an appointive board of non-salaried commissioners has proved its wisdom. "It has been an aid to securing the services, as a board of directors, of persons of experience and distinction, ordinarily not interested in seeking public office, who have worked on

a nonpartisan basis, without bias for their respective States, for the unified interests of the Port District." (p. 186) It might have been expected that the provision for six commissioners to be appointed on a rotating term basis by the Governor of each of the two states would produce an atmosphere of competition between the potentially conflicting interest of the two states. On the contrary, this tradition of public responsibility and of determination to carry out the basic intent and purpose of the compact between the two states has served, almost without exception, to convert each commissioner, shortly after his appointment to the board, into a true citizen of the region.

2. *Relations of Staff to the Commission.* The nature of the relations between the staff and the commission has been no small factor in the creation and maintenance of this tradition of public responsibility. Every staff member is continuously impressed with the basic assumption that the commission is expecting from him the highest in performance and integrity. In turn, the presentation of every problem by the director or staff to the commission is colored by the parallel assumption that the commissioners want all of the facts and are prepared to reach an objective decision for the best interests of the Port District as a whole.

The commissioners are exceedingly busy men who have other time consuming interests, and there are practical limits to the time which they can reasonably be expected to devote to Authority matters. In recognition of this fact, some highly effective techniques have been developed to keep the commissioners adequately informed at all times about the Authority's problems and developments so that they are in a position to act wisely on policy issues which they alone can settle.

In a concise, readable, confidential weekly report which reaches the desk of each commissioner every Monday morning (and is used, incidentally, as a means of keeping key staff members currently informed), the director summarizes all important developments. He reports on the status of negotiations affecting new projects; summarizes current operating problems and financial trends; and

indicates construction progress—in short, he takes continuous current stock of the vast Port Authority enterprise.

The commission, which normally meets as a whole once a month, conducts much of its business through several committees. In presenting matters for consideration either by committees or by the board as a whole, the staff employs unusual and effective techniques that in a minimum of time will give the commissioners all the information they need in order to act wisely. The physical facilities of the board room itself indicate the development of these techniques. Encased in the wall at one end of the room facing the horseshoe table around which the board members sit is a projection arrangement which permits pictorial slides, charts, and other materials to be thrown on the screen concurrently with a staff member's oral presentation of the facts of any situation and his recommendation. The usual procedures to facilitate a committee or board meeting, such as an advance agenda, are always used, and the appropriate staff officers are invited to be present when the commission or one of its committees considers issues. This practice contributes much to the *esprit de corps* among the staff and to the rapport between the staff and the commission.

Periodic tours of inspection of the physical facilities of the Authority are arranged for members of the commission. These again serve to give the commissioners that intimate familiarity with the program and activities of the Authority which only visual and personal contact can provide.

3. *The Atmosphere of a Private Business.* The Port Authority has many attributes of a public agency, including under certain conditions the right to condemn property, freedom from taxation on its property or income, and freedom from legal suit except by consent. But conspicuously and importantly absent from among its powers is that to tax and to pledge the credit of either or both of the states whose creature it is. It had to build its own credit base; it has to make its projects pay.

These needs become even more difficult to accomplish because the projects, by their very nature, are those which in the normal course

of events private enterprise does not find it financially feasible to undertake. They are marginal in character, and are in that narrow border between the possibility of a profit which would enable them to be privately undertaken and the necessity for a public subsidy which the Port Authority cannot supply.

Therefore, the operations of the Port Authority are always conducted in an atmosphere which, on the one hand, is highly sensitive, as indicated above, to its public responsibility, but, on the other hand, is always subject to the same kind of economic prods which make for efficiency in private operations. It would be untrue to say that there is a profit motive in the operation of the Port Authority, but the necessity to pay its own way is psychologically not unlike the profit motive.

Very wisely the founders of the Port Authority recognized that to operate successfully in this environment it must have an autonomy and a freedom from restrictive controls not usually granted a public agency. Thus the Authority has had complete responsibility for the development of its own merit system of personnel administration. It has set up its own system of accounting and auditing. It has not even had to make its annual appearance before budget authorities and appropriation committees, since it receives no operating funds from either state. It has developed its own set of relationships with the financial community for the floatation of its revenue bonds.

There is little or no evidence that this autonomy has in any way been abused, but there is abundant evidence that without such autonomy it would have been difficult, if not impossible, for the Authority to have paid its way, and thus to have made its invaluable contribution to the Port District.

The Port Authority's demonstrated success may indeed prove to be one of its keenest problems in the future. As Mr. Bird puts it,

Affluence, rather than penury, would appear to be the Authority's potential financial hazard. With the development of large earning power, the steady urge for economy that arises from necessity has been removed; and with the continuing avail-

ability of abundant reserves, the undertaking of new enterprises that are submarginal in character might prove tempting. Public and private interests, aware of the Port Authority's managerial skill and financial equipment, may be expected to advance a heterogeneity of financially impracticable projects as highly desirable undertakings. (p. 186)

The Authority's affluence, coupled with its commitment to such a wide variety of ambitious projects, may also serve to raise a question as to its sensitivity to its obligation to the people of the Port District who are the primary users of its facilities. The toll revenue from its tunnels and bridges is clearly and necessarily the main source of its financial soundness. The people of the two states, through their legislatures, have accepted the wisdom of the principle of pooling revenues from a multiplicity of Port Authority projects in order to create financial reserves without which it would be impossible to finance the many new projects for the benefit and development of the Port District as a whole. The two states have pledged themselves through legislation not to impair the Authority's rate- and toll-making power so long as any general reserve bonds are outstanding. Nevertheless, the bridges and tunnels do not exist primarily for the promotion of other projects in the Port area, however useful and desirable these other projects may be. The users of the bridges and tunnels may rightfully expect the Port Authority to be sensitive to their interests, as well as to its need for a credit base to finance new projects, even though they may be of unquestioned benefit to the Port District as a whole. It requires considerable wisdom and statesmanship for the Port Authority to maintain the delicate balance among these interests.

Mr. Bird's study shows, in his own words, that

... the Port Authority is not merely a successful agency for constructing and operating public works that can be made to pay their way through service charges, but an increasingly effective instrumentality for the unified planning, protection and development of a vast and unusually complex metropolitan region. (p. 183)

Götterdämmerung in the Knoxville Twilight

By Lee S. Greene, The University of Tennessee

THE TENNESSEE. VOLUME II, THE NEW RIVER, CIVIL WAR TO TVA, by DONALD DAVIDSON. Rinehart and Company, 1948. Pp. viii, 377. \$3.50.

THE *Tennessee* is one of a series of books on the rivers of America. In this series it is unique in that it gives some considerable attention to the river basin as a basic element in resource conservation. In truth, a book on the Tennessee which made any pretense to recency would be compelled to recognize the Tennessee Valley Authority. Still, the other river systems of the country have resource problems and thus furnish the locales in which multiple-purpose river control programs are developing, in spite of bureaucratic hell and natural high water, a fact which is pretty generally passed over by the companion books in the series. The volume which deals with the Missouri offers the reader little to suggest the possibility of a multiple-purpose authority in the region or even to suggest that modern technology might change the Missouri from a perpetual problem into a means of reviving a suffering region. A doubting paragraph or two is tossed to Fort Peck Dam and the subject closed by elevating the passing remark of a riverman to the level of a time-honored proverb—a typical literary way of being folksy. The volume on the Sacramento flows by with never a word on the Central Valley Project and the battle it has aroused. But Donald Davidson has recognized the changes wrought by TVA and has given the Authority more than passing mention in his second volume on the Tennessee River.

What he has to say is of particular interest for two reasons. First, as the struggle to decide who shall control and develop our rivers grows hotter (the Hoover Commission has served to highlight the whole matter, not without some Rembrandt-like patches of deep shade) the record of the Authority and the interpretations put upon its program have renewed importance. Every effort to keep the record clear is therefore significant. Second, Donald Davidson has been an aggressive spokesman for re-

gionalism and hence what he sees in the Authority is something of a test at once of the Authority and of the particular brand of regionalism which Davidson represents.

It is interesting that regionalism had a strong flavor of the literary and the artistic in its origin. It represented at first (and it still represents in some quarters) the protest of the writer and the artist against a centralization which starves the region of its cultural integrity and uniqueness while separating the center from its contact with the hinterland and reality. It may be, too, that this protest voices something of the artist's rejection of his own unwilling difference from the ordinary mortal. If so, this variety of regionalist, by identifying himself with a past which his contemporaries are hastily forgetting for the benefits of standardized technology, may succeed in becoming no more than a lonely antiquarian.

Donald Davidson's views of regionalism have been specifically expressed in two places. He was a member of the group centered in Vanderbilt University which announced its rejection of industrialization for the South in *I'll Take My Stand*. About ten years ago, he gave a more complete form to the expression of what, in his own words, "his soul will believe" in *The Attack on Leviathan*, a series of stimulating, not to say provoking, essays. As Davidson allows himself a layman's complete freedom to judge a wide range of expert opinion, I may perhaps permit myself a similar freedom in selecting from his essays those passages which seem to me to reveal his ideas and emotions. I believe a key to these is found in the essay "Still Rebels, Still Yankees." Here he draws a contrast between Vermonter and Georgian, based upon an impressionistic interpretation of man and the landscape. The regions and the people differ from one another but God is in His Heaven (in a regional sort of way) in both places, in spite of the *Macon Telegraph* and the *New Republic*. The only devil in these regions is industrialization. Certain other matters, such as racial conflict, poor diet, low

wages, wasting resources, are no part of this portraiture.

To be sure, the existence of some southern problems is admitted in the essays, "Social Science and Regionalism" and "Howard Odum and the Sociological Proteus." Here, while dealing gently with Professor Odum, Davidson reveals again his distaste for the economic interpretation of history, the radical wing of the New Deal, and the use of nonsouthern specialists. Sectional resentment is the garlic in this salad.

What happens when a poet and essayist of regionalism is faced with regional development on the TVA model? The results are presented in the concluding chapters of the second volume of *The Tennessee*, and even though Professor Davidson is writing for popular consumption (and does a first-class job of making the Authority interesting) one can sense his unhappiness. The old order is passing.

Near the ferry landing, not far from the blazing piles, stands a little house. It must go, too. It is in the way of the water and will be wrecked or burned. The house of some sharecropper or mussel fisher, perhaps. If it were a mansion, its fate would be the same. They are burning up the country again, along the Tennessee River—to make way for rising water. To make way for the Tennessee Valley Authority. For President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the shining New Deal. . . .

In Knoxville, at this quiet moment of evening, the offices of the TVA are vacant, and the economists, the agricultural experts, the power engineers, the planners, the authorities have all gone to dinner, in excellently serviced homes on the Kingston Pike or in Norris Village. . . . (p. 358)

This is a fair sample of Davidson's manner with the Authority. There is the same nostalgia here, and throughout a good portion of his discussion of TVA, which permeates much of his poetry, particularly that collected in the 1938 volume, *Lee in the Mountains*.

Why do they come? What do they seek
Who build but never read their Greek?
The classic stillness of a pool
Beleaguered in its certitude
By aimless motors that can make
Only uncertainty more sure;
(On a Replica of the Parthenon)

No more the sound of guns. The silence drags
Over the sunken breast-works and old graves
Where bones forget their names, and only earth
Utters fragments we know not how to reap.
No sound of guns. A different thunder plagues
The far-off streets where smokes recoil and languor
Dogs the blue cannoneers who now too late
Flinch from the lanyard. . . .
(The Last Charge)

Walking into the shadows, walking alone
Where the sun falls through the ruined boughs of
locusts
Up to the president's office. . . .
(Lee in the Mountains)

This is the backward glance, the longing for the past, the resistance to change which so greatly characterizes Davidson's view.

To any reader sympathetic to the aims and purposes of a basin authority the account of TVA in this volume is a constant irritant, for the achievements of the Authority make their way to the reader through pages well larded with "snide" remarks. Such is the one quoted above which miraculously transfers the employees of TVA from their scattered homes in and around Norris and Knoxville to the model village and the few wealthy miles of Kingston Pike. Some of these remarks deserve to be recited, even when torn from their contexts. Norris Village is too fine to be a resettlement project. It can only harbor people with few children and no nearby kinfolks—the staff of TVA. (p. 229) Still one could commend Norris Village for pleasantness. "It was a lesson in something or other that Americans ought to learn." (p. 230) The reservoirs create a permanent flood where "there would be removals of many a family from homes where, in symbol or in fact, the Revolutionary sword or the pioneer rifle still hung above the mantel." (p. 237) (Who cares about having hay driers or electric washing machines, anyway, when our Revolutionary swords lie scattered at the bottom of the lake?) Elsewhere, Davidson admits that a large share of those removing didn't move far, and probably didn't mind anyway (and that TVA aided them to relocate, so far as it could), but the change is annoying to him, nevertheless. The Authority was "eternally busy—no one knew exactly why—with adult education, library service, and such miscellaneous endeavors." (p. 254) Professor Davidson is deter-

mined not to like Santa Claus—not unless he wears a coonskin cap.

Yet, incomplete and unfair as Davidson's aspersions are as a description of the Authority's meaning for the South (and, now, particularly, for other river systems in the country) some basic considerations lie back of them which require comments, perhaps answers. Davidson believes the Authority to be a centralizing agency (his use of the term, decentralized, when applied to the Authority often wears quotation marks). The change from Lilienthal to Clapp as chairman of the board of directors is pictured as the change from one king to another. "In other days, if you were discontented with a power company, you could appeal to the government. If you were discontented with TVA, to whom did you appeal? TVA was the government. In the Tennessee Valley there was nothing above it." (p. 333) Even if some of this is discounted as the sort of reckless exaggeration which professional writers seem to find necessary to their trade, the hard core of disapproval still remains. It is the sort of disapproval which will be heard from political figures in the Northwest or from the lips of a Missouri Valley farmer.

There is an answer to this, but it is not one which will satisfy a purely local outlook. There are now very few significant problems which can be dealt with by state or local action alone. The notion persists (it is surely one of our most prevalent myths) that the extension of national authority is but the ever-lengthening grasp of the bureaucrat. Our curiously unpolitical citizen (in the guise of college professor, stock-raiser, or even, supposedly, the politician) fails to see that nothing short of a sense of imminent distress has generally persuaded Congress to undertake a function. In the Tennessee Valley Authority, there is something above the TVA, politically. If Professor Davidson will step down to the county courthouse he will find it in the party machines whose ideas are directly and powerfully reflected in the national Congress. Through these machines a Congress has been created which long ago accepted responsibility for internal transportation improvements and which only within this generation undertook the full task of flood control, after the states and local communities had steadfastly stuck in their own silt. Exactly the

same sort of resignation of local authority is now going on in the Tennessee Valley in the matter of stream pollution. Exactly the same type of history has been made in the Central Valley of California, where the problems are more peculiarly those of a single state than can be said of the Tennessee Valley. I would be inclined to agree with Professor Davidson that this is a regrettable and unpleasant fact, but it seems particularly unjust that he has elected to attack the one agency which has tried most deliberately, often to the possible disadvantage of its own program, to support and develop state and local agencies. The river systems of the country are undergoing change and that by federal agencies; the choice is not so much between change and no change, as between the Authority and the Pick-Sloan system. For the real friend of decentralization the answer would seem to be clear.

But if the choice for change has been made, it is a choice displeasing to our author—and to many others, too, who can be encountered easily enough in the valley, although the edge of their displeasure has been blunted by events. The agrarians who took their stand on the old order are partly scattered. The measure of their disappointment can be read in the final chapters of *The Tennessee*. Industry and the industrial society is arriving and with it better incomes, better and wider education, and a face turned away from the past. In this change TVA has aided, as it has likewise aided in rebuilding rural life.

That the writings of Davidson show as unmistakably as they do the southerner's resentment of a patronizing outer world should occasion no surprise. One does not have to be a professional southerner to know this feeling. Indeed he who does not experience in the South at least an occasional irritation at the misapprehensions shown by wealthier sections is either a temporary sojourner or the possessor of unusual objectivity—or indifference. This rejection of the outer world is the typical reaction of the periphery toward the center. Could anything be more characteristic of the field office's response to the central bureaucracy? Yet the view of regionalism which, in our society, holds firmly to the economy and the social outlook of a rural society must assuredly be mistaken, for such an economy cannot help but be

dominated by the wealth, population, and political power which flow inevitably to the industrial center. Our author is pained by the flooding of land and the loss of old farms and homes. The removal of the population (orderly though it may be) is to him tragic. But the real tragedy for a region is the loss of its youth; that has been the fate of the South and of the Tennessee Valley, and of the Missouri Valley, and the Colorado Valley, as well. On the plains farm machinery makes larger farms possible; abandoned farm houses (not farms) abound in the countryside. The small towns are dying, if not already dead. The motor car takes the farmer to the county-seat town. But many of the young people do not stop there, partly because there is nothing for them to do. Whether or not industry can be developed in the Missouri Valley remains to be seen. How far it can be developed in the South may also be open to question, but if it is not developed this population movement will not stop. However ideal the old agricultural system may have been, it cannot resist change. A generation born to motorcar and tractor will not willingly return to mules.

It is curious, too, at least to this reviewer, that anyone who values the arts, and who at the same time must wish to see them reach a larger fraction of our population (and for what else does the teacher exist?), could fail to welcome the wealth which industrialization can bring. The refinements of life cannot endure, except for a very limited few, in a purely agricultural economy. A hydroelectric power system means not only washing machines, but symphony or-

chestras. I have a feeling that the educated musician prefers his folk music treated by a Tchaikovsky, a Brahms, a Bartok, or for our own mountains, a Siringfield. In his essay in *I'll Take My Stand*, Professor Davidson says: "The shop-girl does not recite Shakespeare before breakfast." (I would add—nor does the farm hand. But the shop-girl could see Shaw's *Caesar and Cleopatra* or Shakespeare's *Henry V*, at least the movie version, after dinner, which is more than the farm hand can do.)

That the development of the Tennessee River has awaited the intervention of the central government cannot be laid on any innate devilry of the central agents. The Tennessee flowed idly for many years. The Colorado and the Missouri likewise cut their channels mostly unused until the central government intervened, although even now powerful politicians of the plains protest the "super-state" which they see in an MVA, while swallowing complacently, as before, a less decentralized Pick-Sloan arrangement. Regionalism in our time must accept central aid and adapt it to its needs. The alternative regionalism is a sort of deliberate retreat into the backwashes of the past.

"Darkness is falling on the Tennessee. Where is Reynoldsburg Island in this darkness? Or Danville, or the mouth of Big Sandy? Or what used to be Paris Landing?" (p. 359) Gone, evidently. Under water, probably. But it is not an unrelieved twilight. All over the Valley, little lights are coming on, in farm houses and in factories,—electric lights, which were not there sixteen years ago.

Federal Position Classification and Pay Legislation

The Eighty-first Congress in its first session adopted legislation that substantially modified (a) the position classification and pay policies, rates, and procedures of federal white-collar workers; (b) the salary schedule of top positions in the executive branch; (c) the rates of pay in the postal service; and (d) the rates of pay in the military service. A summary of the schedules for white-collar workers and top executive positions is given below.

The Classification Act of 1949¹ supersedes the Classification Act of 1923 as amended and is the principal statute governing rates of pay for federal white-collar workers. It covers some 885,000 positions, located in nearly every department and agency, in the District of Columbia, in the forty-eight states, and in territories,

possessions, and foreign countries. It does not apply to the postal field service, the State Department Foreign Service, a number of agencies such as the Atomic Energy Commission, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the Inland Waterways Corporation, and several groups to which it is impracticable or undesirable to apply fixed graded schedules.

It establishes two schedules of grades and annual salary ranges—a General Schedule (GS) of 18 grades and a Crafts, Protective, and Custodial Schedule (CPC) of 10 grades. The General Schedule replaces the Professional and Scientific Service, the Subprofessional Service, and the Clerical, Administrative, and Fiscal Service of the former law. The three highest GS grades are new.

Grades, Minimum and Maximum Salary Rates, Number of Rates, and Step Increase of General Schedule and the Grades and Minimum and Maximum Salary Rates Replaced

New Grade	Minimum	Maximum	No. of Rates	Step Increase	Old Grades	Minimum	Maximum
GS-1	\$ 2,200	\$ 2,680	7	\$ 80	SP-1, SP-2, CAF-1	\$ 2,020	\$ 2,573.52
GS-2	2,450	2,930	7	80	SP-3, CAF-2	2,284	2,724.00
GS-3	2,650	3,130	7	80	SP-4, CAF-3	2,498.28	2,949.72
GS-4	2,875	3,355	7	80	SP-5, CAF-4	2,724	3,175.44
GS-5	3,100	3,850	7	125	SP-6, CAF-5, P-1	2,974.80	3,727.20
GS-6	3,450	4,200	7	125	SP-7, CAF-6	3,351	4,103.40
GS-7	3,825	4,575	7	125	SP-8, CAF-7, P-2	3,727.20	4,479.60
GS-8	4,200	4,950	7	125	CAF-8	4,103.40	4,855.80
GS-9	4,600	5,350	7	125	CAF-9, P-3	4,479.60	5,232
GS-10	5,000	5,750	7	125	CAF-10	4,855.80	5,608.20
GS-11	5,400	6,400	6	200	CAF-11, P-4	5,232	6,235.20
GS-12	6,400	7,400	6	200	CAF-12, P-5	6,235.20	7,192.80
GS-13	7,600	8,600	6	200	CAF-13, P-6	7,432.20	8,389.80
GS-14	8,800	9,800	6	200	CAF-14, P-7	8,509.50	9,706.50
GS-15	10,000	11,000	5	250	CAF-15, P-8	10,305	10,330
GS-16 ^(a)	11,200	12,000	5	200			
GS-17 ^(b)	12,200	13,000	5	200			
GS-18 ^(c)	14,000	-	-	-			

^(a) Limited to 300 positions

^(b) Limited to 75 positions

^(c) Limited to 35 positions

¹ Public Law 429

Crafts, Protective, and Custodial Schedule

Grade	Minimum	Maximum	Number of Rates	Step-Increase
CPC-1	\$1,510	\$1,870	7	\$ 60
CPC-2	2,120	2,540	7	70
CPC-3	2,252	2,732	7	80
CPC-4	2,450	2,930	7	80
CPC-5	2,674	3,154	7	80
CPC-6	2,900	3,380	7	80
CPC-7	3,125	3,725	7	100
CPC-8	3,400	4,150	7	125
CPC-9	3,775	4,525	7	125
CPC-10	4,150	4,900	7	125

Public Law 359, 81st Congress, approved October 15, 1949, fixes a higher salary schedule for 229 top positions in the executive branch of the federal government. Former salaries of these executives ranged from \$10,000 to \$15,000 per year. New salaries range from \$14,000 to \$22,500 per year. The law may be summarized as follows:

Heads of executive departments
(Cabinet officers) \$22,500

Deputy Secretary of Defense 20,000

Secretaries of Army, Navy, and Air
Force 18,000

Under Secretaries of executive
departments, Deputy Postmaster
General, Assistant to the Attorney
General, the Solicitor General, the
Comptroller General, the Director
of the Bureau of the Budget, the
Chairman of the NSRB, the Federal
Security Administrator, the Admin-
istrator of Veterans' Affairs, the
Administrator of General Services,
and the Housing and Home Finance
Administrator 17,500

Chairman of the Munitions Board,
Chairman of the Research and De-
velopment Board, Assistant Comp-
troller General, Assistant Director
of the Bureau of the Budget, Deputy
Administrator of Veterans' Affairs,
Director of Central Intelligence,
Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Director, Director of the FBI, Chair-
man of the Civil Service Commis-
sion, Chairman of Board of Export-
Import Bank, Chairman of Board
of RFC, Chairman of United States
Maritime Commission, members of
Council of Economic Advisers,
members of Board of Governors of
Federal Reserve System, and mem-
bers of Board of Directors of FDIC 16,000

Members of most independent
boards and commissions 15,000

Assistant Secretaries of executive
departments 15,000

Certain bureau heads, such as Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue, Ad-
ministrator of Civil Aeronautics 15,000

Territorial governors 15,000

A few heads of bureaus or inde-
pendent commissions or boards 14,000

The President is authorized to fix
the compensation of six administra-
tive assistants, the Executive Secre-
tary of the National Security Coun-
cil, and five other secretaries or
other immediate staff assistants in
the White House Office as follows:
two at rates not exceeding \$20,000
per annum, three at rates not ex-
ceeding \$18,000 per annum, and
seven at rates not exceeding \$15,000
per annum.

Amended Constitution of the American Society for Public Administration

I. Name and Purposes

a. The name of this organization shall be the American Society for Public Administration.

b. This Society is organized for the following educational and scientific purposes:

1) To facilitate the exchange of knowledge and results of experience among persons interested or engaged in the field of public administration;

2) To encourage the collection, compilation, and dissemination of information on matters relating to public administration;

3) To advance generally the science, processes, and art of public administration.

II. Membership

a. Any person interested in the purposes of the Society shall be eligible for membership.

b. The membership of the Society shall be divided into three classes: members, sustaining members, and junior members. Persons twenty-eight years old or under shall be classified as junior members. Sustaining members and junior members shall have all privileges of members. Hereafter unless specifically noted otherwise the term member includes junior members and sustaining members.

c. The annual dues of members shall be as follows: Sustaining members \$10 or more, members \$5, junior members \$3. The Council of the Society may change the amount of dues for the classes of membership if it finds a change to be in the best interest of the Society, provided, however, that no member's dues shall be raised within the year for which they have been paid.¹

d. After due notice any member delinquent in dues for more than six months shall be

dropped from membership. The Council may expel any member when it deems such action to be in the best interest of the Society.

e. All members shall have the right to vote for officers and for Council members of the Society, to attend meetings of the Society, to hold office, and to receive the regular publications of the Society.

f. Libraries, educational institutions, and other organizations may become subscribers to publications of the Society in accordance with terms prescribed by the Council.

III. Council

a. The governing body of the Society shall be the Council which shall consist of the President, Vice President, the three most recent past presidents who are still members, and fifteen members elected by the membership, three of whom shall be juniors at the time of election. The persons named as the first members of the Council in the certificate of incorporation shall serve until the first annual meeting of the members. At the first annual meeting of members, three members shall be elected to the Council for a term of three years, three for a term of two years, and three for a term of one year. At the first annual meeting of members at which newly created vacancies on the Council are to be filled, one-third of such new members shall be elected for a term of three years, one-third for a term of two years, and one-third for a term of one year. Following the expiration of their first terms, the terms of all Council members shall be three years. Officers and Council members shall serve until their successors are elected and take office. The President shall fill by appointment any vacancy in the Council caused by death, resignation, or other inability to serve, or by lack of a sufficient number of past presidents.

b. The Council shall be vested with the

¹ At a meeting March 12, 1949, the Council adopted the following resolution: "Resolved, that the dues of members and the rate for subscribers be raised from \$5 to \$6 effective July 1, 1949."

management of the affairs of the Society and shall act in the capacity of a board of directors. The Council shall adopt such rules as may be appropriate for the governance of the Society. The Council shall have the power to contract for all necessary things and services in connection with the management of the Society, including the employment of auditors, and to delegate powers and duties to its officers and employees, and to provide for the business and conduct of annual and special meetings; the establishment of regional, state, or local chapters; special activities for junior members; and the issuance and distribution of the Society's journal and other publications.

c. An Executive Committee, consisting of the President, Vice President, most recent past president, and two members of the Council appointed by the President, with the approval of the Council, shall have the power to exercise all the functions of the Council between annual meetings and when the Council is not in session. All actions taken by the Executive Committee shall be reported promptly to the members of the Council.

IV. Officers and Editorial Board

a. The officers of the Society shall be a President, a Vice President, and a Secretary-Treasurer.

b. The President and the Vice President shall be elected by the members of the Society at the annual meeting for a term of one year or until their successors are elected and take office. Until the first annual meeting of the incorporated Society, the persons who have been acting as such officers of the unincorporated Society of the same name shall be the President and the Vice President of the Society.

c. The Secretary-Treasurer shall be appointed by the Council and shall serve at its pleasure.

d. The President, after each annual meeting, shall appoint an Editor-in-Chief and seven other members of the Editorial Board of the Society's journal. At least two of the members of the Editorial Board shall be replaced by new members in every year.

V. Nominations and Elections

a. The President shall appoint a Nominating Committee not less than sixty days prior

to each annual meeting. The Nominating Committee shall consist of the three most recent past presidents able and willing to serve thereon. If there are not three past presidents available the President may appoint a sufficient number of other members to complete the Committee. The Nominating Committee shall present nominations for officers and Council members at the annual meeting of members.

b. Additional nominations may be made from the floor by any member at the time the Nominating Committee makes its report.

c. All nominations shall be voted on by separate vote for each office. All members present shall be entitled to vote. The nominee receiving the highest number of votes for each office shall be declared elected and shall thereupon take office.

d. The Council may provide for election by mail ballot to each member in any year in which it is impossible to hold an annual meeting by reason of war or other national emergency. Space shall be provided on the ballot for writing in the names of additional candidates. The nominee receiving the highest number of votes for each office shall be declared elected and shall thereupon take office.

VI. Quorum

Seven members of the Council, three members of the Executive Committee, and twenty-five members of the Society shall respectively constitute a quorum. All action shall be by majority vote of members present, unless otherwise provided by law or in this Constitution.

VII. Chapters

a. It shall be the policy of the Society to encourage and recognize the establishment of regional, state, and local chapters of its members and junior members.

b. Chapters may be certified under such rules and policies as may be adopted by the Council from time to time.

VIII. Meetings

a. The annual meeting of members shall be held at a time and place designated by the Council. The President or Council may call special meetings.

b. Meetings of the Council or Executive Committee shall be held upon written or printed notice to be mailed not less than five nor more than forty days before the date of the meeting. Meetings shall be at the call of the President, or of any five members of the Council, or of three members of the Committee.

*IX. Waiver of Notice and Action
Without Meeting*

a. Any person entitled to vote at any meeting of members, or of the Council, or of the Executive Committee, may waive notice of the time, place, and purpose of such meeting either before or after the date of such meeting, and any action taken or resolution adopted thereat shall, upon such waiver, be as valid as though notice had been given.

b. Any action or resolution which might be taken or adopted at any meeting of the members, Executive Committee, or Council shall be valid if written memorandum of such action or resolution is duly served upon all persons entitled to vote thereon in the manner prescribed for notice of a meeting, and if such action or resolution is approved in writing by a majority of the persons voting thereon, unless otherwise prescribed by law.

X. Amendments

This Constitution may be amended by a majority vote of members present and voting at any annual meeting or special meeting called therefor, provided the proposed amendment or amendments have been approved by the Council or have been submitted to the Secretary-Treasurer by petition of twenty-five or more members.

News of the Society

ASPA Conference

March 10-12, 1950—Friday through Sunday

Statler Hotel, Washington, D. C.

CHAPTER NEWS

Regional Meetings

On Friday evening, September 30, at the Plymouth Congregational Church in Seattle approximately 125 people came together for the first Pacific Northwest Regional Dinner Conference of the Society. There were representatives present from California, Oregon, Washington, and Idaho; they came from universities and city, county, state, and federal governments.

The main address was made by Roscoe C. Martin, President of the Society, who spoke on "We Not-Always-Happy Few, an Examination of the State of Public Administration." Frank Pace, Jr., director of the budget of the United States, spoke briefly on "Scientific Management and Government." An informal question and answer period followed the speeches.

Presiding over the session and largely responsible for it was J. W. Rupley, ASPA Council member and chief field representative, U. S. Bureau of the Budget at San Francisco. He was assisted in the arrangements by Professor George Shipman, head of the Public Affairs Institute of the University of Washington, and other members of the local chapter.

It was the consensus among those present that further regional meetings should be held. The Oregon Chapter representatives invited the group to meet in Portland in the fall of 1950 for the second annual Pacific Northwest Regional Conference and the invitation was accepted unanimously.

Alabama

The fall dinner meeting of the Alabama Chapter of the American Society for Public Administration was held at the Town House in Montgomery, November 17. The chief speaker was Herbert Emmerich, director of Public Administration Clearing House, Chicago, who discussed "The Hoover Commission and Its Report."

California—University of California (Berkeley)

Newly elected officers are: *President*—Herbert Motkin; *Vice President*—Wendell MacCoby; *Secretary-Treasurer*—Dorae Seymour; *Board Members*—Joyce Cunningham and Robert Schreiber.

Plans for the year 1949-50 include (a) panel discussions where students meet and seek advice from experts in choosing a career and (b) field trips to governmental agencies. At the first panel discussion for the current year Richard Bigger, formerly with the TVA and US Bureau of the Budget, spoke on "Opportunities in Government for College Graduates in Social Science."

California—University of Southern California

New officers of the chapter are: *President*—William Gore; *Vice President*—Robert Calahan; *Secretary*—Grace Lindsey; *Treasurer*—George Phillips; *Directors*—Kenneth Walsh, Patricia Houghton, and Burke Sheeran.

At the final program of the 1948-49 year the following panel discussed the place of administration in the structure of government: Kenneth Hahn, Los Angeles city councilman;

Kenneth Lynch, assistant state attorney general; Gordon Bain, CAA area executive officer; and Leonard J. Roach, Los Angeles county supervisor.

Plans for 1949-50 include seven programs and two social meetings.

Colorado—Denver

The program for March 17 consisted of a debate on "Resolved that in the Opinion of this House the Existing System of Grants-in-Aid among Federal, State and Local Governments Has Been Abused and Carried Too Far." Speaking in favor of the proposed resolution were Senator Averill C. Johnson and Mr. Con Shea. Opposed were Judge William E. Doyle and Mr. Jerome Grutza. A vote was taken before the debate began, showing 13 for the resolution and 15 against. At the completion of the debate the vote was 15 for and 13 against.

At a meeting June 16 Wallace Vawter, Fred Bennion, and C. L. Edwards discussed the Hoover Commission reports. Mr. Vawter presented an over-all discussion; Mr. Bennion limited his area primarily to the economy concepts of the reports; Mr. Edwards discussed recommendations relating to personnel practices.

District of Columbia

At the first dinner meeting of the year, October 12, William L. Batt, Jr., special assistant to the Secretary of Labor, led a discussion of "The Government and Full Employment." The following panel described the parts their organizations are playing in this important program: James L. Kelly, Department of Commerce; Thomas J. Hitch, Council of Economic Advisers; Robert Hubbell, Office of the Assistant to the President; Edward L. Keenan, Department of Labor; and James W. Follin, General Services Administration.

At the second dinner meeting, November 3, Harold Stein, staff director, Committee on Public Administration Cases, discussed "The Kings River Project in the Great Central Valley."

The chapter is a joint sponsor with the local chapter of the Society for the Advancement of Management of four round table programs

in the current year. Subjects are: (1) executive development; (2) management problems of other governments and international agencies; (3) budgeting; and (4) effectuation of Executive Order 10072, which provides for continuing action to improve the management of the executive branch. Round tables meet monthly.

Georgia

The chapter held its first meeting of the current year October 25. Colonel Morris Abrams discussed the registration law in Georgia.

Idaho—Boise

The new Boise Chapter was launched at a dinner meeting November 2 with Paul H. Appleby, dean of the Maxwell School, Syracuse University, as the speaker of the evening. The meeting brought together some sixty federal, state, and city administrative officials.

Illinois—Chicago

At its first monthly meeting in 1949-50, Robert C. Smith, director of industrial relations, Pullman Standard Car Manufacturing Company, discussed "Today's Challenge to Public Administrators."

The meeting of November 16 was addressed by Rubin G. Cohn, associate professor, College of Law, University of Illinois. His subject was "The Legislative Process."

Illinois—University of Chicago

At a meeting October 21, the chapter formulated plans for the year. These include (a) monthly meetings for the discussion of research projects which the members have under way and (b) luncheon meetings, approximately monthly, at the University Quadrangle Club.

The first luncheon meeting of the year was held November 3 with J. A. C. Robertson, deputy establishments officer of the British Treasury, as guest speaker.

On November 15 the chapter met jointly with the Political Science Club. Three doctoral candidates presented a discussion of their research: Frederick Bent, "British Municipal Trade Unions"; Ralph Jans, "The

Negro and the Supreme Court"; and Alex Gottfried, "A. J. Cermak."

Kentucky

The Kentucky Chapter met September 13 in Frankfort for a dinner and business meeting, with 44 members and guests present.

The feature of the program was a talk by Henry Ward, commissioner of the Kentucky Department of Conservation, who spoke on the development and administration of the state park system—an old program which is being given new emphasis. He described the existing state park system and the need for new parks; the difficulties in recruiting and holding qualified personnel; the sources of revenue for the park system, means of financing, construction and maintenance, and types of expenditures.

Maryland

The first dinner meeting of the year 1949-50 was held October 19 with 65 persons present. The discussion was led by Russell Davis, Maryland state employment commissioner, who discussed the "Maryland State Merit System," and James Watson of the National Civil Service League, who discussed "Better Municipal Personnel." Mr. Davis stated that the philosophy behind the state merit system has not kept pace with the growth and increased complexity of government problems. He outlined as objectives of a modern merit system: (1) to assist operating departments in getting their jobs done by providing real personnel guidance; (2) to provide departments with efficient employees; (3) to provide a career service and attract the best qualified individuals for civil service positions; and (4) to weed out and get rid of inefficient employees in the civil service.

Mr. Watson discussed problems that have beset municipal civil service systems and the civil service in general. There are many instances where civil service regulations have been a hindrance rather than an aid to efficient government. The importance of tenure has been overstressed. Insufficient use is made of the probation period as a real weeding out process. The National Civil Service League can organize popular support for a good merit system, but it is incumbent on the legislatures

and civil service commissions to eliminate the defects which give rise to the currently prevailing criticisms of civil service.

Massachusetts

The Massachusetts Chapter began the current year with a meeting October 13 at which President Roscoe C. Martin was the guest speaker. Mr. Martin challenged some of the dogmas of public administration in his address, "Big Administration and Little Administration." In substance, his contention was that public administration is not the same at all levels of government, nor even the same within different governmental units at the same level. The tone and temper of administration differ with the structure of government and with the person administering. Public administration varies with the ecology and climate of government that prevails. Big administration as usually discussed in the textbooks is to be found mostly at the federal level. Little administration, as frequently if not generally found at the local level, is so unlike administration at the federal level that actually they are two distinct types. Instruction as offered in courses in public administration in college normally is an analysis of big administration, and the principles taught may apply only partially, or in some instances not at all, at the local level. This is in part due to the fact that administration at the local level is much more concerned with programs than with procedures, and that the programs in question are much closer to the people and therefore more political. The local administrator is constantly aware of the people he serves. He operates directly rather than through elaborate procedures.

New officers elected at the meeting are as follows: *President*—John B. Atkinson, city manager, Cambridge, Massachusetts; *First Vice President*—Thomas J. Greehan, director, Massachusetts Civil Service and Registration Department; *Second Vice President*—William A. Foley, regional director, First United States Civil Service Region, Boston; *Directors*—Walter W. Mode, executive assistant, Region I, Federal Security Agency; John M. Gaus, professor, Harvard Graduate School of Public Administration; Charles R. Cherington, professor, Harvard Graduate School of Public

Administration; Julius Kellner, Kellner Associates (formerly with the Federal Social Security Agency).

Michigan—University of Michigan

At the coffee hour business meeting on October 7, the following officers for the fall semester were elected: *President*—Tom Dinell; *Vice President*—Dorothee E. Strauss; *Secretary*—William Young; *Treasurer*—Daniel R. Cloutier.

Professor James K. Pollock spoke on the administration of overseas affairs at the first social seminar of the year.

The chapter this autumn sponsored a movie, "Boomerang," as a fund-raising project. Each member was responsible for selling 30 tickets.

New York—Capital District

The chapter held its first meeting for 1949-50, October 10. President Roscoe C. Martin discussed "University Training for the Public Service." About 75 persons were present.

New York—Metropolitan Area

The first meeting of the current year was devoted to "Special Purpose Authorities in Metropolitan Areas." The panel consisted of Jim Buckley, Port of New York Authority; Seth Hess, director, Interstate Sanitation Commission; and Bob Sawyer, author of a critical study of *ad hoc* agencies.

North Carolina—University of North Carolina

At its meeting October 21 the chapter elected the following officers: *President*—Mrs. Mary Albert; *Vice President*—Frank K. Gibson; *Council*—Lowell Ashby, Department of Economics; Paul Ashby, Department of Political Science; James M. Webb, Department of City and Regional Planning. Charles Bernard was chosen secretary.

Oregon

Paul H. Appleby, Dean of the Maxwell School, Syracuse University, spoke on the report of the Hoover Commission at a meeting November 3 that was sponsored jointly by the chapter and Reed College.

Texas—North Texas

At a meeting October 24 John Moseley of the administrative management division, U. S. Bureau of the Budget, discussed the managerial reform movement before thirty-nine members and guests. He outlined the series of steps which have been taken to improve federal management and described interrelationships between the reorganization plans which the Congress has recently adopted, the Reclassification Act of 1949, the management program of the Bureau of the Budget, and other measures. He also spoke of the good which comes from such devices as performance budgeting, work measurement, and project programming.

Utah

On September 29 approximately forty affiliates of the local chapter, including representatives of the federal fields service, state and local government, staff of the Institute of Government of the University of Utah, and its new class of graduate trainees in public administration, met at a luncheon to hear President Roscoe C. Martin. Dr. Martin expressed pleasure at the wide representation of governmental service in the chapter and the unique connection being developed with the Institute of Government of the University of Utah. He elaborated upon this theme in his address, stressing the importance of reconciliation between theory and practice in the field of public administration generally.

Virginia—Charlottesville-Albemarle

The chapter held its last meeting for the 1948-49 scholastic year on May 21 at the home of Dr. Weldon Cooper. Guest speaker was Herbert Emmerich, director, Public Administration Clearing House, who led a discussion on "The Adjustment of the Individual under the Mechanization of Modern Technology."

Wisconsin—Milwaukee

A meeting was held September 15 to discuss "Long-Term Planning of Public Works." The chairman was M. W. Torkelson, director of regional planning, State Planning Board, and the panel consisted of Wayne Anderson, economic analyst, Long-Term Improvement

Technical Committee, City of Milwaukee, and Eugene Howard, acting director of public works, Milwaukee County.

Puerto Rico

At a meeting in August Louis Brownlow spoke on the work of the President's Commit-

tee on Administrative Management in 1937, of which he was chairman, and James Rowe, a member of the Hoover Commission, described some of the objectives of that body. Mr. Rowe is chairman and Mr. Brownlow a member of the recently appointed Commission for Reorganization of the Insular Government.

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